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Executive summary  
This document is Deliverable D2.3 of Task T2.4, WP2 – Privacy of the PROTECT project. The aim of D2.3 is to 
analyse whether the PROTECT project entails a potential substantial interference into individuals’ rights to 
privacy and to data protection, as protected under articles 7 & 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
if so to manage the identified risks to these rights of data subject by proceeding to an impact assessment. As 
a reminder, the PROTECT project implies the collection and storage of emerging biometric data of a huge 
number of “bona fide” travellers (in addition to the biometric data already collected and stored in the travel 
documents and the IT databases which were described in D2.2 – Legal framework of biometric border 
control).  
In D2.2, it was assumed that the purpose of the PROTECT system was to “facilitate” public border control 
authorities to speed up their public interest missions of border control management by enrolling emerging 
biometrics in travel documents (or smartphone apps acting as travel documents) in addition to passport 
information (including traditional biometric modalities: facial image and fingerprints). However, the main 
conclusion of D2.2 was that the abovementioned scenario should certainly be considered as beyond the 
scope of current EU legislation. One of the main reasons for D2.2’s conclusion is that consent of travellers 
cannot legally be considered as a legitimate basis of lawfulness under the GDPR to allow public border control 
authorities to speed up their public interest missions by enrolling additional biometrics in travel documents 
(which currently may not be replaced by a smartphone app). This finding of illegality of D3.1 scenarios in 
“real-world conditions” does not oppose the goals of the demonstration phase of the PROTECT project. Trials 
conducted exclusively for research purposes could demonstrate the feasibility of combining passport 
information (including traditional biometrics) and additional contactless biometrics of volunteers, with their 
explicit consent, with the aim of matching their identities against fictional (emulated) “watchlists” specifically 
developed for these scientific trials. The data protection safeguards of such trials (such as consent forms and 
security requirements) will be described in a future version of D2.1 – “Data management Plan”. 
The purpose of this Deliverable “D2.3 - Privacy impact of next-generation biometric border control” is to 
analyse whether, as an alternative to D3.1 scenarios, emerging biometric modalities could be processed in a 
“passport companion”, such as a smartphone for “comfort and convenience purposes” of travellers, on the 
basis of a contract with the PROTECT’s data controller and travellers’ explicit consent. The idea is to analyse 
− from a privacy and data protection point of view − the possibility and the conditions in real-world conditions 
to enrol emerging biometrics in a smartphone app for travellers willing to join a “PROTECT programme” 
allowing them to be given priority in waiting areas for “traditional” security and border checks and/or 
allowing them to benefit from additional conveniences such as access to VIP parking zones or waiting 
lounges. In order to carry out this analysis, this Deliverable performs a Data Protection Impact Assessment 
(DPIA) which is required by Article 35 of the GDPR. A DPIA is a process designed to describe the processing, 
assess its necessity and proportionality, and help manage risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons 
resulting from the processing of personal data, by assessing the risks and determining the measures to 
address them. In this Deliverable, the methodology which was chosen to conduct this DPIA is based on the 
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Definitions 
Article 29 Working Party: The Article 29 Working Party is composed of representatives from all EU Data 
Protection Authorities, the EDPS and the European Commission. It was set up under the Directive 95/46/EC. 
It has advisory status and acts independently.  
Biometric Capture Area (BCA): a short corridor with biometric sensors that capture biometric modalities on 
the move. 
Biometric data: Article 4(14) of the GDPR defines “biometric data” as personal data resulting from specific 
technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, 
which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic 
data. 
Biometric template: Key features can be extracted from the raw form of biometric data (e.g. facial 
measurements from an image) and stored for later processing rather than the raw data itself. This forms the 
biometric template of the data. The definition of the size (the quantity of information) of the template is a 
crucial issue. On the one hand, the size of the template should be wide enough to manage security (avoiding 
overlaps between different biometric data, or identity substitutions), on the other hand, the size of the 
template should not be too large so as to avoid the risks of biometric data reconstruction. The generation of 
the template should be a one-way process, in that it should not be possible to regenerate the raw biometric 
data from the template. 
Biometric enrolment: Encompasses all the processes that are carried out within a biometric system in order 
to extract biometric data from a biometric source and link this data to an individual. The quantity and the 
quality of data required during enrolment should be sufficient to allow for his/her accurate identification, 
authentication, categorization or verification without recording excessive data. The amount of data extracted 
from a biometric source during the enrolment phase has to be adequate for the purpose of the processing 
and the level of performance of the biometric system. 
Biometric storage: The data obtained during enrolment can be stored locally in the operations centre where 
the enrolment took place (e.g. in a reader) for later use, or on a device carried by the individual (e.g. on a 
smart card) or could be sent and stored in a centralized database accessible by one or more biometric 
systems. 
Biometric matching: The comparison of a reference template against a verification template extracted from 
acquired sensor data (e.g. image to image match). 
Biometric identification: The identification of an individual by a biometric system is typically the process of 
comparing biometric data of an individual (acquired at the time of the identification) to a number of 
biometric templates stored in a database (i.e. a one-to-many matching process). 
Biometric verification/authentication: The verification of an individual by a biometric system is typically the 
process of comparing the biometric data of an individual (acquired at the time of the verification) to a single 
biometric template stored in a device (i.e. a one-to-one matching process). 
Facial image: means digital images of the face with sufficient image resolution and quality to be used in 
automated biometric matching. 
European Data Protection Supervisor: The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is an independent 
institution of the EU, responsible under Article 41(2) of Regulation 45/2001 ‘With respect to the processing 
of personal data… for ensuring that the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular 
their right to privacy, are respected by the Community institutions and bodies’, and ‘…for advising 
Community institutions and bodies and data subjects on all matters concerning the processing of personal 
data’. Under Article 28(2) of Regulation 45/2001, the Commission is required, ‘when adopting a legislative 
Proposal relating to the protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms with regard to the processing of 
personal data...’, to consult the EDPS.  
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Entry-Exit System: the Entry/Exit System (EES) is a system to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry 
data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union 
and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes.  
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): On 4 May 2016, the official text of the Regulation has been 
published in the EU Official Journal in all the official languages. The Regulation will enter into force on 24 May 
2016. The objective of this new set of rules is to give citizens back control over of their personal data, and to 
simplify the regulatory environment for business. The data protection reform is a key enabler of the Digital 
Single Market which the Commission has prioritized. The reform will allow European citizens and businesses 
to fully benefit from the digital economy. 
Multi-modal biometrics: They can be defined as the combination of different biometric technologies to 
enhance the accuracy or performance of the system (it is also called multilevel biometrics). Biometric systems 
use two or more biometric traits / modalities from the same individual in the matching process. These 
systems can work in different ways, either collecting different biometrics with different sensors or by 
collecting multiple units of the same biometric. 
Personal data: Article 4(1) of the GDPR defines “personal data” as any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.  
Processing:  Article 4(14) of the GDPR defines “processing” as any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction. 
Schengen Area: The Schengen Area is one of the greatest achievements of the EU. It is an area without 
internal borders, an area within which citizens, many non-EU nationals, business people and tourists can 
freely circulate without being subjected to border checks. Since 1985, it has gradually grown and 
encompasses today almost all EU States and a few associated non-EU countries. While having abolished their 
internal borders, Schengen States have also tightened controls at their common external border on the basis 
of Schengen rules to ensure the security of those living or travelling in the Schengen Area. 
Schengen Border Code: The Schengen Borders Code governs the crossing of the external border, facilitating 
access for those who have a legitimate interest to enter into the EU. A special Local Border Traffic Regime 
has also been established to facilitate entry for non-EU border residents who frequently need to cross the 
EU external border. A common visa policy further facilitates the entry of legal visitors into the EU. 
Sensitive personal data: Article 9(1) of the GDPR defines “sensitive personal” data as personal data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and 
the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data 
concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation. 
Schengen Information System: The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a large-scale information system 
that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States. The SIS 
enables competent authorities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on certain 
categories of wanted or missing persons and objects. An SIS alert not only contains information about a 
particular person or object but also clear instructions on what to do when the person or object has been 
found. Specialised national SIRENE Bureaux serve as single points of contact for any supplementary 
information exchange and coordination of activities related to SIS alerts.  
Source of biometric data: The source of biometric data can vary widely and includes physical, physiological, 
behavioural or psychological elements of an individual. According to the Article 29 Working Party: “the 
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sources of biometric data (e.g. human tissue samples) cannot be considered as biometric data themselves 
but can be used for the collection of biometric data (through the extraction of information from them)”.  
Visa Information System (VIS): The Visa Information System (VIS) allows Schengen States to exchange visa 
data. It consists of a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure that links this central system to 
national systems. VIS connects consulates in non-EU countries and all external border crossing points of 
Schengen States. It processes data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to 
transit through, the Schengen Area. The system can perform biometric matching, primarily of fingerprints, 
for identification and verification purposes. 
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1 Introduction 
As a reminder, the aim of D2.2 was to explore the current and proposed European legal framework regulating 
both biometric border control and personal data protection in order to identify the legal constraints which 
should be taken into account by the scenarios being defined in D3.1. In D2.2, it was assumed that the purpose 
of the PROTECT system was to “facilitate” public border control authorities to speed up their public interest 
missions of border control management by enrolling emerging biometrics in travel documents (or 
smartphone apps acting as travel documents) in addition of passport information (including traditional 
biometric modalities – facial image and fingerprints). By consequence, D2.2 was dedicated to analyse the 
hereunder main legal questions and resulted in the following findings:  
1) Under current EU law, is there a possibility for electronic machine-readable documents to support 
an enhanced set of contactless biometrics? In other words, could emerging biometrics (other than 
facial image and fingerprints) be included in travel documents under current EU law?  
Answer:  Under current EU Regulation, it is very unlikely that inclusion of additional multimodal 
biometrics features (being not facial image or fingerprints) developed within the PROTECT project 
could legally be integrated in ePassports (or residence permits) without a national legislation of a 
Member State allowing it. Furthermore, even if a national law would allow such integration of 
additional biometrics, it would certainly be challenged in Court for privacy reasons related to 
proportionality and data minimization. 
2) Under current EU law, could a smartphone be considered as a travel document to support traditional 
biometrics (fingerprints and facial image) as well as an enhanced set of contactless biometrics?  
Answer:  Under current EU law, it seems very doubtful that mobile devices such as smartphones 
could legally be used to replace travel documents as a result of strict rules regulating the materials 
of travel documents. In other words, smartphones cannot be considered as “travel documents” 
under current EU law and therefore cannot support traditional biometrics (fingerprints and facial 
image) as well as an enhanced set of contactless biometrics for the purpose of border control 
management.  
3) Under current EU law, could consent of a traveller be the legal basis to enrol additional biometrics in 
a travel document for “government use of their personal data”?  
Answer: Recital 43 of the GDPR expressly states that: “in order to ensure that consent is freely given, 
consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case 
where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the 
controller is a public authority and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the 
circumstances of that specific situation”. This means that it seems that consent of travellers cannot 
be considered as a legitimate basis of lawfulness in PROTECT scenarios to allow public border control 
authorities to speed up their public interest missions by enrolling additional biometrics in travel 
documents.  
4) Under current EU law, which constraints related to the entry/exit external border checks for both 
persons enjoying the EU right to free movement and TCNs should be taken into account by the 
PROTECT scenarios?  
Answer: Both for persons enjoying the EU right to free movement and for TCNs, the travel document 
must be presented for verification at each entry/exit of the Schengen area. For this reason, it is very 
doubtful that the passport scenario at land border crossing points described in D3.1 which envisages 
to transmit passport data via a mobile application could be considered as legal under current EU 
border control regulation since that that travel documents must be presented at each entry/exit of 
the Schengen area. 
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5) Under current EU law, which constraints should be taken into account by the PROTECT scenarios 
when making use of technologies such as self-service systems, eGates and automated border control 
systems?  
Answer: Both for persons enjoying the EU right to free movement and for TCNs, it seems very 
doubtful that automated border checks could be operated on the basis of “additional biometrics” 
(other than fingerprints or facial image). Indeed, for persons enjoying the EU right to free movement 
article 8(2) of the SBC explicitly states that “where there are doubts as to the authenticity of the travel 
document or the identity of its holder, at least one of the biometric identifiers integrated into the 
passports and travel documents issued in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 shall be 
verified”. As for TCNs, According to article 8b of the SBC, one of the conditions for persons whose 
border crossing is subject to a registration in the EES to be permitted to use automated border 
control systems is that “the travel document contains a facial image recorded in the electronic 
storage medium (chip) which can be technically accessed by the self-service system so as to verify the 
identity of the holder of the travel document, by comparing that facial image with his or her live facial 
image”. For this reason, and according to the data minimization principle, it seems legally doubtful 
to use additional biometrics (other than facial image – and in certain cases fingerprints) for the 
aforementioned purpose.  
6) Under current EU law, which checks against databases should be taken into account by the PROTECT 
scenarios and which legal constraints derive from these in relation to the development of a 
contactless solution?  
 
Answer: Under current EU law, checks which should be taken into account at external border 
crossings are mainly the ones against the SIS, SLTD, VIS, EES, EURODAC (and the proposed ETIAS) 
databases as well as the API framework. An overview of the legal constraints related to this 
background is provided in Section 4 of Deliverable 2.2.  Currently, one of the main legal constraints 
to take into account when developing a “full” contactless solution is that the VIS is used to verify the 
identity of visa holders by comparing his/her fingerprints with the fingerprints stored in the VIS on 
request of the border guards. The fact that TCNVHs could be required to provide their fingerprint at 
the entry of the Schengen Area should be taken into account when developing a complete 
contactless biometric-based cross-border control solution. The use the facial image for biometric 
matching against the VIS has not yet been implemented. This issue could be resolved once the EES 
becomes functional and TCNVHs would be able to pre-enrol their facial image into that system.  
 
7) Does the PROTECT scenarios fit in with the EU’s own future border control plans, in particular the 
EC’s proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU 
information systems?  
Answer: The EC’s proposed shared biometric matching service confirms the intention of the 
European Council of Thessaloniki to develop a coherent approach on biometric identifiers or 
biometric data for documents for third country nationals, European Union citizens’ passports and 
information systems.1 Fingerprints and facial images are increasingly being promoted by the EU as 
the biometric features which should be used in both travel documents and in border control 
management databases to enhance the tasks of border guards. For this reason, the enrolment of 
additional biometric features (other than fingerprints or facial image) in travel documents for the 
purpose of “facilitating” border control processes, as described in D3.1, should be considered as 
being in contradiction with the data minimization principle enshrined in article 5(c) of the GDPR, 
which reads as follows: “personal data shall be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary 
in relation to the purposes for which they are processed”. Therefore, for the purposes of D3.1 
scenarios, it is recommended to PROTECT technical partners to only focus on the development of 
                                                          
1 The Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council of 19 and 20 June 2003 are available at  
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11638-2003-INIT/en/pdf 
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“emerging” biometric features which could update current facial image standards, for example 2D 
face, iris, periocular and 3D face.  
As a result of the answers to the aforementioned questions, the main conclusion of D2.2 was that the 
scenarios proposed by D3.1 should certainly be considered as beyond the scope of current legislation. One 
of the main reasons of this negative conclusion is that consent of travellers cannot be considered legitimate 
under the GDPR, to allow public border control authorities to speed up their public interest missions by 
enrolling additional biometrics in travel documents (which currently may not be replaced by a smartphone 
app).  
This conclusion that the purpose of the PROTECT system, as defined by D3.1, should be considered non-
compliant with EU norms regulating both travel documents and data protection has fundamental 
consequences on the work to be performed in this Deliverable “D2.3 - Privacy impact of next-generation 
biometric border” control. Indeed, Article 5, 1(b) of the GDPR lists the purpose limitation principle among 
the key data protection principles. It provides that personal data must be “collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes”. 
Specification of purpose is thus an essential first step in applying data protection laws and designing data 
protection safeguards for any processing operation. Indeed, specification of the purpose is a pre-requisite 
for applying other data quality requirements, including the adequacy, relevance, proportionality and 
accuracy of the data collected and the requirements regarding the period of data retention. The most crucial 
issue is that Article 5, 1(b) imposes the purpose to be legitimate. This notion goes beyond the requirement 
to have a legal ground for the processing under Article 6 of the GDPR and also extends to other areas of law, 
such as norms regulating travel documents (which were analysed in D2.2)2. 
For this reason, this Deliverable analyses whether, as an alternative to D3.1 scenarios, emerging biometric 
modalities could be processed in a “passport companion” such as a smartphone for “comfort and 
convenience purposes” of travellers on basis of  a contract and explicit consent. The idea is to analyse − from 
a privacy and data protection point of view − the possibility and the conditions to enrol contactless biometrics 
in a smartphone app for travellers willing to join a “PROTECT programme”.  This would allow them priority in 
waiting areas for “traditional” security and border checks and/or allow them to benefit from additional 
convenience services such as access to VIP parking zones or waiting lounges. Such a purpose seems legitimate 
since, in a consultation of 2005, the CNIL (the French Data Protection Authority) authorized the use of 
fingerprints on a chip card for frequent travellers of the airport of Nice.3 The system, as no password was 
required, was designed for convenience purposes of the travellers (“faciliter la vie”). The CNIL accepted such 
a system based on these two criteria: the voluntary use (the free choice of the data subject) and the storage 
on a local object on which the data subject has control.  
 
1.1 Scenario being analysed in this deliverable 
The purpose of the scenario being analysed in this Deliverable differs from those described in D3.1 in that it 
does not aim to allow public border control authorities to speed up their public interest missions, but instead 
processes emerging biometrics of frequent travellers in order to allow them to benefit from “convenience 
                                                          
2 This finding of illegality in “real-world conditions” does not oppose to the fact that in the demonstration phase of the 
PROTECT project, and exclusively for research purposes, trials could demonstrate the feasibility of combining passport 
information (including traditional biometrics) and additional contactless biometrics of volunteers on the basis of their 
explicit consent with the aim to match their identities against fictional (emulated) “watchlists” specifically developed 
for these scientific trials. The data protection safeguards of such trials (such as consent forms and security requirements) 
will be described in a future version of D2.1 – “Data management Plan”.  
3 Délibération 2005-115 du 07 juin 2005 portant autorisation de la mise en oeuvre par la Chambre de Commerce et 
d’Industrie de Nice-Côte d’Azur d’un traitement automatisé de données à caractère personnel ayant pour finalité la 
gestion d’une carte de fidélité impliquant l’utilisation d’un dispositif biométrique de reconnaissance des empreintes 
digitales - http://data.socnum.com/2005/06/07/deliberation-2005-115-du-07-juin-2005/ 
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services” having no link with public interest missions. Also, for pragmatic reasons, it was decided to only 
legally analyse our “passport companion” scenario (for convenience purposes) at an air or sea border 
(whereby travellers are walking on-the-move). The main reason is that the aim of this deliverable is to provide 
an example of how to fill in the CNIL’s Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) methodology, and that this 
document would be too lengthy if different scenarios had to be analysed.  
This being said, the system would be mainly composed of an Enrolment Kiosk, a Biometric, Capture Area 
(BCA), a smartphone app (“the Passport Companion”) and a PROTECT Control System as illustrated in the 
figure below.  
 
Figure 1 - General overview of the PROTECT system 
1.1.1 Enrolment Kiosk 
The enrolment begins by the traveller presenting a passport to authorized staff of the PROTECT programme. 
After the traveller’s identity is verified and he has signed the PROTECT programme contract, the traveller is 
directed to an enrolment kiosk under supervision of authorized staff where he proceeds to supply a set of 
biometrics including face, hand veins, voice (speaker utterance) and anthropometrics. Finally, these 
biometrics are encrypted and sent to the traveller’s PROTECT application on the mobile phone.  
1.1.2 The Passport Companion 
The smartphone application (“passport companion”) has to communicate with two external systems: the 
Enrolment Kiosk (in order to receive the necessary set of encrypted biometrics) and the PROTECT Control 
System (in order to achieve both decryption of the biometrics and to perform user position tracking). The 
transmission with the Enrolment Kiosk and the PROTECT Control System is achieved using the IEEE 802.11 
protocol (WIFI). This technology was chosen due to its high speed transmission rates and nearly 100% 
smartphone market coverage. At the Enrolment Kiosk, encrypted biometrics are downloaded onto the 
device, while at the PROTECT Control Station the same data is uploaded into a temporary storage. To ensure 
connection security, the WIFI will use the WPA2 encryption standard. The HTTPS-Protocol will be used to 
exchange data packages between the application and the servers of the PROTECT Control Station. Long range 
proximity measurement is also done using IEEE 802.11 protocol. All PROTECT Control-WIFIs will use the same 
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SSID, which are also indicating that it is an “AirSeaBorder-Station”. The application is able to detect nearby 
PREOTECT Control Stations by constantly checking for networks in range that are broadcasting the PROTECT 
Control System SSID. The connection would incorporate SSL, and hence, the “passport companion” 
application will only connect to WIFIs that are valid (i.e., valid PROTECT Control-WIFI). Position tracking is 
done via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). The Biometric Capture Area sends iBeacon signals that are interpreted 
by the phone app. BLE is available on every modern mobile phone. 
1.1.3 Biometric Capture Area (BCA)  
The Biometric Capture Area has as its main objective the identification of a traveller at the border entry while 
they are on the move. The traveller passes through a physical 3D space equipped with sensors able to extract 
a set of biometrics. In order to enhance security levels, the PROTECT Biometric Capture Area incorporates a 
multimodal set of contactless biometrics, including 2D and 3D face, iris, periocular, finger vein, speaker 
recognition and anthropometrics. The Biometric Capture Area solution addresses the process of “on the 
move” traveller identification. In other words, different biometrics are successively acquired as a traveller 
passes through the Biometric Capture Area and traveller verification is performed via multimodal biometric 
fusion by the time the traveller reaches the end of the Biometric Capture Area. 
The BCA works in conjunction with a mobile application (the “Passport Companion”) that can be installed on 
a mobile phone and with the PROTECT Control System. 
1.1.4 The PROTECT Control System  
The main goal of the PROTECT Control System is to perform the verification process. The process starts with 
the person approaching the Biometric Capture Area. The encrypted biometric templates of the traveller are 
transmitted to the PROTECT Control System (the “passport companion” installed on the traveller’s mobile 
device is used to transmit in an encrypted way via WIFI the biometric templates to the PROTECT Control 
System). As the traveller enters the walking corridor in the Biometric Capture Area, two main operations are 
triggered: Person tracking through re-identification (re-identification system), and biometrics verification 
(including Anthropometrics, Face and Periocular). Person tracking through re-identification is not a biometric 
per se, but supports the biometric verification by providing an identifier to the person entering the Biometric 
Capture Area. It then tracks the location of the person moving through the Biometric Capture Area so that 
the biometric verification can be reduced from a 1:m match to a 1:few or even 1:1 match. The PROTECT 
Control system communicates with the biometric verification system to feed forward the biometric template 
of the individual moving through the Biometric Capture Area. The Border Control system also communicates 
with the re-identification system to associate a person identifier number and its corresponding biometric 
template. Once each biometric is verified, the final decision on identity acceptance/rejection is performed 
fusing all individual biometric evaluations.  
 
1.2 Purpose of the document  
This document is Deliverable D2.3 of Task T2.2, WP2 – Privacy of the PROTECT project. The aim of D2.3 is to 
analyse if, as an alternative to D3.1 scenarios, emerging biometric modalities could be processed in a 
“passport companion” such as a smartphone for “comfort and convenience purposes” of travellers on basis 
of a contract with the PROTECT’s data controller and their explicit consent. The idea is to analyse − from a 
privacy and data protection point of view − the possibility and the conditions in real-world conditions to enrol 
emerging biometrics in a smartphone app for travellers willing to join a “PROTECT programme”, which would 
give them priority in waiting areas for “traditional” security and border checks and/or allow them to benefit 
of additional convenience services such as access to VIP parking zones or waiting lounges. In order to carry 
out this analysis, this Deliverable performs a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), which is required by 
Article 35 of the GDPR. A DPIA is a process designed to describe the processing, assess its necessity and 
proportionality and help manage the risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons resulting from the 
processing of personal data by assessing them and determining the measures to address them. In this 
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Deliverable, the methodology which was chosen to conduct this DPIA is based on the one which was 
developed by the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) in February 2018. 
1.3 Document scope 
The document consists of an introduction and four main sections: 
 Section 2 recalls that biometrics are considered as sensitive data by the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), presents the Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) requirement, 
justifies the reason why a DPIA must be carried out for the PROTECT solution and describes the 
French Data Protection Authority’s (CNIL) DPIA methodology; 
 Section 3 applies the CNIL’s DPIA methodology to a PROTECT solution which processes 
contactless biometrics for “convenience purposes”. The aim of this section is to create a new 
category of access-control mechanism particularly suited for border-crossings based on 
multimodal biometric fusion “on the move” while respecting the legal framework and personal 
data security. 
 Section 4 provides an overall conclusion.  
2 Biometrics and privacy 
2.1 Introduction  
The rapid progress of biometric technologies and their expanded application in recent years necessitates 
careful scrutiny from a data protection perspective. Their use in various places of our everyday life is just 
around the corner. Indeed, biometric data processing is now often used in automated 
authentication/verification and identification procedures, in particular for the control of entry to both 
physical and virtual areas (i.e. access to particular electronic systems or services). In 2003, the Article 29 
Working Party (“hereafter WP29”) stressed that “a wide and uncontrolled utilisation of biometrics raises 
concerns with regard to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. This kind of data 
is of a special nature, as it relates to the behavioural and physiological characteristics of an individual and 
may allow his or her unique identification”.4 As biometric technologies are closely linked to certain 
characteristics of an individual, some of them can be used to reveal sensitive data. In addition, many of them 
allow for automated tracking, tracing or profiling of persons and as such their potential impact on the privacy 
and the right to data protection of individuals is high. This impact is increasing through the growing 
deployment of these technologies. Every individual is likely to be enrolled in one or several biometric systems. 
Hence, since the very beginning of their implementation, biometric systems have been acknowledged to have 
the potential to raise strong concerns in several fields, including privacy and data protection, which have 
certainly influenced their social acceptance and fuelled the debate over the legality and limits of their use 
and the safeguards and guarantees needed to mitigate the identified risks. 
2.2 Biometric data are sensitive 
In S & Marper v the UK, the ECtHR held that biometric features constitute personal data containing “certain 
external identification features” which contain “unique information about the individual concerned [sic] 
allowing his or her identification [to be made] with precision in a wide range of circumstances”.5 Biometric 
features hence belong to a special category of more sensitive data.6 In the same way, the General Data 
                                                          
4 Article 29 Working Party, Working document on biometrics, WP80, Adopted on 1 August 2003, p.2.  
5 ECtHR, S. & Marper v the United Kingdom, para. 84. 
6 ECtHR, S. & Marper v the United Kingdom, para. 103. 
Deliverable D2.3 PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 
 Page 17 of 76 
 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)7 considers biometric data as personal data being sensitive.8 In the GDPR, 
“biometric data” are defined as “personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the 
physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique 
identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”. In accordance with the 
GDPR definition, measures of biometric identification or their digital translation in a template form can 
always be considered as "information relating to a natural person" as it concerns data, which provides, by its 
very nature, information about a given person.9 For this reason, the processing of biometric data needs to 
carefully comply with the data protection principles enshrined in EU and national law.   
2.3 Impact on privacy and data protection  
In 2012, the Article 29 Working Party recalled that classical reluctance to biometric systems has been linked 
to the protection of individual rights, and still is. Nevertheless, new systems and developments to existing 
systems raise a range of concerns.10 This includes the possibility of covert collection, storage and processing 
as well as the collection of material with highly sensitive information that can invade the most intimate space 
of the individual. 
The WP29 recalls that “function creep has been a serious concern since the biometric technologies and 
systems were first used; even though that is a well-known and addressed risk in traditional biometrics, it is 
undoubtedly clear that the higher technical potential of new computer systems raises the risk of data being 
used against their original purpose. Covert techniques allow for the identification of individuals without their 
knowledge, resulting in a serious threat for privacy and a leak of control over personal data. That has serious 
consequences on their capacity to exercise free consent or simply get information about the processing”11. 
The WP29 also stresses that “taking into account the fact that biometric technologies cannot ensure full 
accuracy, there is always an implicit risk coming from incorrect identifications. Such false positives result in 
decisions affecting individual rights. Identity theft based on the use of spoofed or stolen biometric sources 
can lead to serious damages. Unlike in other identification systems, the individual cannot be simply provided 
with a new identification just because it is compromised”12. Finally, the Working Party states that “reference 
should be made to profiling in the context of taking automated decisions or to predict behaviour or 
preferences in a specific situation. Some biometric data can reveal physical information about an individual. 
This can be used for targeting and profiling purposes but also end up in discrimination, stigmatization or 
unwanted confrontation with non-expected / desired information”.13     
    
2.4 The Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) requirement 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The Article 29 Working Party has always supported the inclusion of a “risk-based approach” in the EU data 
protection legal framework.14 It is important to note that – even with the adoption of a risk-based approach 
                                                          
7 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
8 On 4 May 2016, the official texts of the Regulation and the Directive have been published in the EU Official Journal. 
The GDPR entered into force on 24 May 2016 and applies since 25 May 2018. 
9 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, Adopted on 20th June 2007, p. 8.   
10 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, WP193, adopted on 27th April 
2012, p.17.  
11 Ibidem.  
12 Ibid, p18.  
13 Ibidem.  
14 Article 29 Working party, Statement on the role of a risk-based approach in data protection legal frameworks, WP 
218, adopted on 30 May 2014.  
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– there is no question of the rights of individuals being weakened in respect of their personal data. Those 
rights must be just as strong even if the processing in question is relatively ‘low risk’. Rather, the scalability 
of legal obligations based on risk addresses compliance mechanisms.  
In line with this risk-based approach, the GDPR requires controllers to implement appropriate measures to 
ensure and be able to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR, taking into account among others the “the 
risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons”. The reference to “the 
rights and freedoms” of data subjects primarily concerns the rights to data protection and privacy but may 
also involve other fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of 
movement, prohibition of discrimination, right to liberty, conscience and religion. 
In consistence with the risk-based approach, Article 35 of the GDPR introduces the concept of a Data 
Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). A DPIA is a process designed to describe the processing, assess its 
necessity and proportionality and help manage the risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons 
resulting from the processing of personal data by assessing them and determining the measures to address 
them. DPIAs are important tools for accountability, as they help controllers not only to comply with 
requirements of the GDPR, but also to demonstrate that appropriate measures have been taken to ensure 
compliance with the GDPR. In other words, a DPIA is a process for building and demonstrating compliance. 
This being said, carrying out a DPIA is not mandatory for every processing operation. A DPIA is only required 
when the processing is “likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”. 
 In order to ensure a consistent interpretation of the circumstances in which a DPIA is mandatory, the Article 
29 Working Party issued guidelines to clarify this notion and provide criteria to help identify the 
circumstances in which a DPIA is needed15. 
2.4.2 DPIA required for the PROTECT solution 
According to the Article 29 Working Party in its WP 248, a DPIA “is particularly relevant when a new data 
processing technology is being introduced”.16 The Working Party details that a DPIA is required for 
“innovative use or applying new technological or organisational solutions, like combining use of finger print 
and face recognition for improved physical access control, etc.”. Indeed, Recital 89 of the GDPR states that 
processing operations needing a DPIA to be carried out “may be those which in, particular, involve using new 
technologies, or are of a new kind and where no data protection impact assessment has been carried out 
before by the controller”. The GDPR makes it thus clear that the use of a new technology, defined in 
“accordance with the achieved state of technological knowledge” (recital 91), can trigger the need to carry 
out a DPIA. This is because the use of such technology can involve novel forms of data collection and usage, 
possibly with a high risk to individuals’ rights and freedoms. Indeed, the personal and social consequences of 
the deployment of a new technology may be unknown. A DPIA will help the data controller to understand 
and to treat such risks. To our knowledge, no DPIA has been previously carried out for a technology like that 
being developed within PROTECT, and which consists of a multimodal biometric solution for identity 
confirmation “on-the-move” of travellers with the aim to facilitate and speed up their border crossings. 
Please also note that the UK’s data protection authority considers that DPIA must always been carried out 
when biometric data is planned to be processed.17Hence it seems doubtful that a DPIA is required to assess 
the data protection impact of the technology product being developed in the PROTECT project.  
This reasoning will also help the consortium to demonstrate data protection compliance and transparency 
towards the European Commission.  
                                                          
15 See Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether 
processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP 248 rev.01, adopted on 4 April 
2017, last revised and adopted on 4 October 2017 
16 Ibid., p. 8.  
17 See https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-
governance/data-protection-impact-assessments/ 
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2.4.3 General content of the DPIA 
The GDPR sets out the minimum features of a DPIA (Article 35(7), and recitals 84 and 90): 
 “a description of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes of the processing”; 
 “an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing”; 
 “an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects”; 
 “the measures envisaged to: 
o “address the risks”; 
o “demonstrate compliance with this Regulation”. 
The figure hereunder of the Article 29 Working Party illustrates the generic iterative process for carrying out 
a DPIA. 
 
Figure 2 - Process for carrying out a DPIA 
 
2.4.4 Criteria for an acceptable DPIA methodology 
The GDPR provides flexibility to determine the precise structure and form of the DPIA to allow it to fit with 
existing working practices. Different methodologies could be used to assist in the implementation of the basic 
requirements set out in the GDPR. To standardise these different approaches, common criteria have been 
identified by the Article 29 Working Party.18 The criteria listed in the figure below can be used to show that a 
particular DPIA methodology meets the standards required by the GDPR.  
                                                          
18 Ibid., p.22.  
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Figure 3 - Criteria for an acceptable DPIA methodology 
2.4.5 Choice of a methodology  
On November 2017, the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) released on its website an open source 
ready to use software tool for DPIAs, which can be downloaded for free.19 In February 2018, to assist in this 
process and take into account all GDPR requirements, CNIL has updated its “PIA Guides” as well as its DPIA 
                                                          
19 See https://www.cnil.fr/en/open-source-pia-software-helps-carry-out-data-protection-impact-assesment 
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tool.20 The method describes how to use the EBIOS21 method in the specific context of "Personal Data 
Protection". It is consistent with the WP29 Guidelines and with risk management international standards.  
CNIL’s DPIA method is composed of three guides: 
 The method explains how to carry out a PIA; 
 The models help to formalize a PIA by detailing how to handle the different sections introduced in 
the method; 
 The knowledge base is a code of practice that lists measures to be used to treat the risks. 
 
Figure 4 - CNIL’s DPIA methodology 
Given the broad recognition of CNIL’s fulfilment in the protection of personal data, the fact that the CNIL’s 
DPIA tool is open source and is well documented, it was decided to base PROTECT’s DPIA on this 
methodology.  
3 PROTECT’s system DPIA   
3.1 Study of the context 
The objective of this section is to gain a clear overview of the personal data processing operations under 
consideration.  
3.1.1 Overview of the processing  
This section should:  
 Present a brief outline of the product under consideration, its nature, scope, context, purposes and 
stakes 
 Identify the data controller and any processors. 
 List the references applicable to the processing, which are necessary or must be complied with, not 
least the approved codes of conduct.  
                                                          
20 See https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnil-publishes-update-its-pia-guides 
21 EBIOS – Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité (Expression of Needs and Identification of 
Security Objectives) – is the name of the risk management methodology published by the Agence Nationale de la 
Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI/French National Cybersecurity Agency). 
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Description of the processing under consideration 
Description of the processing 
 
The PROTECT system processes contactless biometrics (2D 
(VIS and NIR) Face, 3D Face, Periocular (VIS and NIR) and 
Anthropometrics) of travellers in a smartphone app (“passport 
companion”) which communicates with a Biometric Capture 
Area (BCA) in which biometric sensors are placed for their 
identity confirmation “on the move”.  
Processing purposes  The aim of the “PROTECT programme” is to allow travellers 
joining the programme to be given priority in waiting areas for 
“traditional” security and border checks and/or allowing them 
to benefit of additional convenience services such as access to 
VIP parking zones or waiting lounges. The aim of processing 
contactless biometrics in the passport companion and in the 
BCA is to keep the flow of travellers moving at an acceptable 
rate.  
Processing stakes Create a new category of access-control mechanism 
particularly suited for border-crossings based on multimodal 
biometric fusion “on the move” while in keeping with the legal 
framework and personal data security. 
Controller Not identifiable at this stage. The controller will be the firm or 
the public authority which will factually decide to use the 
PROTECT System.   
Processor(s) None 
Table 1- Description of the processing under consideration 
Sector-specific standards applicable to the processing22 
Standards applicable to the processing  Consideration  
No codes of conduct or certifications regarding data protection are applicable in the field at this 
moment.  
Table 2 - Sector-specific standards applicable to the processing 
3.1.2 Data, processes and supporting assets  
This section should define and describe the scope in detail: 
 the personal data concerned, the categories thereof, the recipients and persons with access thereto; 
 description of the processes and personal data supporting assets for the entire personal data life 
cycle (from collection to erasure). 
3.1.2.1 Data processed  
Below you will find a table setting out a detailed list of the data processed and persons with access thereto. 










                                                          
22 This table should contain a list of the references applicable to the processing, which are necessary or must be complied 
with, not least the approved codes of conduct (see Art. 40 of the GDPR) and certifications regarding data protection 
(see Art. 42 of the GDPR) 
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Table 3 - List of the data processed 
3.1.2.2 Life cycle of data and processes  
In this section, we present and describe how the PROTECT system generally works during both the enrolment 
and the verification phases in the scenario at an air or sea border, with diagrams of data flows and a detailed 
description of the processes being carried out. 
3.1.2.2.1 Enrolment phase 
In our scenario, a biometric passport is presented to authorized staff at the enrolment kiosk in order to verify 
the identity of the traveller willing to join the “PROTECT convenience programme”. In a second step, the 
traveller will then proceed to supply a set of biometrics including face, hand veins, voice (speaker utterance) 
and anthropometrics. Finally, these emerging biometrics are encrypted and sent to the traveller’s PROTECT 
application (“Passport companion”) on the mobile phone. 
The figure below illustrates the enrolment process: 
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Figure 5 - Enrolment process 
3.1.2.2.2 Verification phase 
In our scenario, the verification process is automatically initiated when the user approaches the Biometric 
Capture Area on foot. The traveller’s own mobile device computes from iBeacon signals that they are 
approaching the Biometric Capture Area. The PROTECT “passport companion” then transfers the encrypted 
biometric data; there is no need for the traveller to stop at the entry kiosk. The PROTECT Control System then 
decrypts the biometric templates. In a second step the user then enters the Biometric Capture Area so that 
their biometrics can be extracted and matched with those decrypted from their mobile device.  
In other words, as the traveller enters the walking corridor in the Biometric Capture Area, two main 
operations are triggered: Person tracking through re-identification (re-identification system), and biometrics 
verification (Including anthropometrics, Face and Periocular). Person tracking through re-identification is not 
a biometric per se but supports the biometric verification by providing an identifier to the person entering 
the Biometric Capture Area, then tracks the person moving through the Biometric Capture Area so that the 
biometric verification can be reduced from a 1:m match to a 1:few or even 1:1 match. The PROTECT Control 
system communicates with the biometric verification system to feed forward the biometric template of the 
individual moving through the Biometric Capture Area. The PROTECT Control system communicates as well 
with the re-identification system to associate a person identifier number and its corresponding biometric 
template. Once each biometric is verified, the final decision on identity acceptance/rejection is performed 
fusing all individual biometric evaluations.  
The following graphic provides a short, simplified overview of the verification process: 
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Figure 6 - Verification process 
3.1.2.2.3 Overall description of processes being carried out  
Below you will find a table for listing in detail all the data processing operations carried out. 
Processes Detailed description of the process 
1. The traveller wishes to enrol 
to the PROTECT programme 
At the enrolment kiosk, authorized staff manually authenticate 
a traveller presenting a passport. After identification, the 
traveller signs a contract specifying the convenience services 
for which he wants to use the PROTECT system.  
2. The traveller proceeds to 
enrolment  
At the enrolment kiosk, the traveller provides emerging 
biometrics: 2D (VIS and NIR) Face, 3D Face, Periocular (VIS and 
NIR) and Anthropometrics. The enrolment kiosk encrypts the 
set of biometrics and issues a unique encryption key, which is 
sent to the key database. 
3. Biometrics are stored on the 
passport companion 
The traveller downloads the “passport companion” from the 
app store. The encrypted biometrics are sent (via WIFI) by to 
the traveller’s mobile phone. 
4. The traveller wishes to identify 
himself at the border entry  
The passport companion uploads (via WIFI) the enrolled 
encrypted biometrics (which are stored on the smartphone) to 
the PROTECT Control System.  
5. The traveller walks to the 
Biometric Capture Area 
The smartphone detects the traveller entering the BCA with 
IBeacons (Bluetooth Low Energy for position tracking) and the 
PROTECT Control System gets notified.  
6. The traveller passes through 
the Biometric Capture Area 
The BCA provides (via WIFI) recorded biometrics from the 
tunnel to the PROTECT Control System.  
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7. The PROTECT Control System 
proceeds to the verification of 
the identity of the traveller 
The PROTECT Control System decrypts the biometrics with the 
corresponding key from the key database and verifies the 
traveller by comparing with biometrics received from the BCA 
8. The Border Control System 
notifies authorized staff and the 
traveller about the result of the 
verification 
The PROTECT Control System notifies authorized staff and the 
traveller about the result of the verification and removes the 
biometrics from the PROTECT Control System.  
Table 4 - Overall description of processes 
3.1.2.3 Data supporting assets and storage duration  
Below you will find a table for listing in detail the data supporting assets with corresponding data types and 
storage duration. 
Data Types IT systems on which the data rely Storage duration  
Passport data No IT system. Manual verification by 





Templates of biometric data: 
2D (VIS and NIR) Face, 3D 




Enrolment kiosk at controller’s premises 
Duration of the 
encryption process during 
the enrolment phase in 
order to issue the 
encryption key  
 
PROTECT Control System at controller’s 
premises  
Duration of the 
verification of the 
templates against 




Encrypted templates of 
biometric data: 2D (VIS and 
NIR) Face, 3D Face, Periocular 
(VIS and NIR) and 
Anthropometrics. 
 
Smartphone of the traveller 
 
Duration of the traveller’s 
registration to the 
PROTECT programme 
 
PROTECT Control System at controller’s 
premises 
Duration of the 
decryption process only 






Encryption key of the 
traveller’s passport data  
 
 
Enrolment kiosk at controller’s premises.  
Duration of the 
encryption process during 
the enrolment phase in 
order to issue the 
encryption key 
 
Key database at controller’s premises 
Duration of the traveller’s 
registration to the 
PROTECT programme 
 
PROTECT Control System at controller’s 
premises  
Duration of decryption 
process only in order to 
obtain readable templates 
of additional biometrics 
for the verification 
process  
Live biometric data: 2D (VIS 
and NIR) Face, 3D Face, 
Periocular (VIS and NIR) and 
Anthropometrics. 
Biometric Capture Area at controller’s 
premises  
Duration of the walk 
through the BCA  
 
PROTECT Control System at controller’s 
premises 
Duration of the 
verification process 
against the biometric 
templates 
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WIFI information  WIFI infrastructure at Controller’s 
premises  
Duration of the enrolment 
phase for the connection 
between smartphone and 
enrolment kiosk 
Smartphone of the traveller  
WIFI infrastructure at Controller’s 
premises 
Duration of the 
verification phase for the 
connection between 
smartphone and the 
PROTECT Control System  
Smartphone of the traveller 
IBeacons (Bluetooth Low 
Energy for position tracking) 
Infrastructure at Controller’s premises  Duration of the 
verification phase for 
positioning purposes 
Smartphone of the traveller  
Table 5 - Data supporting assets and storage duration 
3.2 Study of the fundamental principles 
The overall objective of this section is to ensure that the system is built in compliance with privacy principles. 
3.2.1 Controls guaranteeing the proportionality and necessity of the processing 
The aim of this sub-section is to:  
 Explain and justify the choices made to comply with the following requirements: 
1. purpose(s): specified, explicit and legitimate (see Art. 5.1 (b) of the GDPR); 
2. basis: lawfulness of processing, prohibition of misuse (see Art. 6 of the GDPR); 
3. data minimisation: adequate, relevant and limited (see Art. 5 (c) of the GDPR); 
4. quality of data: accurate and kept up-to-date (see Art. 5 (d) of the GDPR); 
5. storage periods: limited (see Art. 5 (e) of the GDPR). 
 Check that improving the way in which each point is planned, clarified and justified, pursuant to the 
[GDPR], is either not necessary or not possible. 
 Where applicable, review their description or propose additional controls. 
3.2.1.1 Explanation and justification of purposes 
According to Article 5.1 (b) of the GDPR, personal data must be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes […] (‘purpose 
limitation’)”. This principle implies firstly a clear determination of the purpose for which the biometric data 
are collected and processed. Furthermore, an evaluation of the respect for proportionality and the respect 
for legitimacy is necessary, taking into account the risks for the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms of individuals and notably whether or not the intended purpose could be achieved in a less intrusive 
way. Proportionality has been the main criterion in almost all decisions taken to date by the Data Protection 
Authorities on the processing of biometric data.  
The table below sets out in detail the data processing purposes and for justifying their legitimacy23. 
Purposes Legitimacy 
Scenario 1: The aim of the PROTECT 
system is to provide the possibility for 
travellers to enrol emerging biometric 
Applicable: In a 2005 deliberation, the CNIL (French 
DPA) authorized the use of fingerprints on a fidelity 
chipcard (not a travel document) for frequent travellers 
                                                          
23 On the legitimacy of the purpose, see opinion WP 203 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party - 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf 
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modalities (other than fingerprints and 
facial image) in a smartphone 
application (“the passport companion”) 
for comfort and convenience purposes. 
The idea to process emerging 
contactless biometrics in the “passport 
companion” and to verify them24 against 
biometrics recorded in the biometric 
capture area (BCA)25 is to allow 
travellers joining the “PROTECT 
programme” to be given priority in 
waiting areas for “traditional” security 
and border checks and/or to allow them 
to benefit of additional convenience 
services such as access to VIP parking 
zones or waiting lounges. In short, the 
general purpose of the PROTECT system 
is to provide travellers to access 
controlled zones. No further processing 
is envisaged.  
of the airport of Nice. The system was designed for 
convenience purposes (facilitate access to parking zones, 
additional services, etc.): Important criteria were the 1) 




                                                          
24 In other words, different biometrics are successively acquired as a traveller passes through the Biometric Capture 
Area and traveller verification is performed via multimodal biometric fusion by the time the traveller reaches the end 
of the Biometric Capture Area. 
25 The Biometric Capture Area is instrumented with sensors to capture images and data from travellers as they pass 
through the area. 
26 Délibération 2005-115 du 07 juin 2005 portant autorisation de la mise en oeuvre par la Chambre de Commerce et 
d’Industrie de Nice-Côte d’Azur d’un traitement automatisé de données à caractère personnel ayant pour finalité la 
gestion d’une carte de fidélité impliquant l’utilisation d’un dispositif biométrique de reconnaissance des empreintes 
digitales - http://data.socnum.com/2005/06/07/deliberation-2005-115-du-07-juin-2005/ 
PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 Deliverable D2.3 
Page 30 of 76  
 
 
Figure 7 - CNIL accepts biometrics for convenience 
 
Scenario 2: The aim of the PROTECT 
system is to provide the possibility for 
travellers to enrol passport data 
(including traditional biometrics – 
fingerprints and facial image) as well as 
additional biometric modalities in a 
smartphone application for the purpose 
of “facilitating” border control by border 
authorities (including checks against 
border control IT databases such as VIS, 
SIS, EES, and SLTD). In this scenario, the 
PROTECT system not only processes 
new biometric modalities but also travel 
document data in mobile devices so that 
data capture for border control 
purposes can be more convenient to 
travellers and more timely for border 
authorities.  
Not applicable: Under current EU Regulation, additional 
multimodal biometrics features (being not facial image 
or fingerprints) developed within the PROTECT project 
cannot legally be integrated in ePassports (or residence 
permits) without a national legislation of a Member State 
allowing it. Furthermore, even if a national law would 
allow such integration of additional biometrics, it would 
certainly be challenged in Court for privacy reasons 
related to proportionality and data minimization.  
 
It is also important to note that under current EU law, 
mobile devices such as smartphones cannot legally be 
used to replace travel documents as a result of strict 
rules regulating the materials of travel documents. In 
other words, smartphones cannot be considered as 
“travel documents” under current EU law and therefore 
cannot support traditional biometrics (fingerprints and 
facial image) as well as an enhanced set of contactless 
biometrics for the purpose of border control 
management.  
 
A third important point is that Recital 43 of the GDPR 
expressly states that: “in order to ensure that consent is 
freely given, consent should not provide a valid legal 
ground for the processing of personal data in a specific 
case where there is a clear imbalance between the data 
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subject and the controller, in particular where the 
controller is a public authority and it is therefore unlikely 
that consent was freely given in all the circumstances of 
that specific situation”. This means that it seems that 
consent of travellers cannot be considered as a legitimate 
basis of lawfulness in PROTECT scenarios to allow public 
border control authorities to speed up their public 
interest missions by enrolling additional biometrics in 
travel documents. 
 
For additional details concerning these findings, see D2.2 
- Legal framework of biometric border control.  
Table 6 - Explanation and justification of purposes 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, the requirement according to which “personal data must be 
collected for legitimate purposes” means that the purposes must be “in accordance with the law” in the 
broadest sense: “this includes all forms of written and common law, primary and secondary legislation, 
municipal decrees, judicial precedents, constitutional principles, fundamental rights, other legal principles, 
as well as jurisprudence, as such 'law' would be interpreted and taken into account by competent courts”.27 
Therefore, in table 6, scenario 2 must be considered as “illegitimate” since that it would be in contradiction 
with the current legal framework on biometric border control as analysed in D2.2. For this reason, as an 
alternative, scenario 1 (see table 6) will be analysed in this Deliverable.  
3.2.1.2 Explanation and justification of lawfulness 
Below you will find the list of lawfulness criteria. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at 
least one of the following applies28: 
Lawfulness criteria Applicable Justification  
The data subject has given 
consent to the processing of his 
or her personal data for one or 
more specific purposes 
 
Yes 
Applicable but, in the absence 
of other alternative legitimate 
grounds, the PROTECT 
biometric authentication 
system could be used only if 
the travellers are free to 
decide whether to avail 
themselves of the said 
system. This means that 
alternative, less privacy-
intrusive mechanisms must 
be made available by the 
controller of PROTECT. Such a 
system will permit a traveller 
who is unwilling or unable to 
undergo biometric processing 
because of his/her personal 
circumstances to dissent. The 
sole choice between not using 
a service and giving one’s 
biometric data is a strong 
indicator that the consent 
                                                          
27 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, WP203, adopted on 2 April 2013, p.20.  
28 See article 6 of the GDPR.  
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was not freely given and 
cannot be considered as 
legitimate ground. 
Processing is necessary for the 
performance of a contract to 
which the data subject is party or 
in order to take steps at the 
request of the data subject prior 





Applicable. Processing of 
biometric data can be 
necessary for the 
performance of a contract to 
which the 
data subject is party or can be 
necessary in order to take 
steps at the request of the 
data subject 
prior to entering into a 
contract. In our scenario, the 
purpose of the contract is to 
offer convenience services to 
travellers “on the move”.  
Processing is necessary for 
compliance with a legal 





The processing of contactless 
biometrics is not necessary 
for compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the 
controller is subject.  
Processing is necessary in order 
to protect the vital interests of 





The processing of contactless 
biometrics is not necessary to 
protect the vital interests of 
the data subject or of another 
natural person.  
Processing is necessary for the 
performance of a task carried out 
in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority 




The processing of contactless 
biometrics is not necessary 
for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public 
interest or in the exercise of 
official authority vested in the 
controller.  
Processing is necessary for the 
purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party, 
except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests or 
fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the data subject which require 
protection of personal data, in 
particular where the data subject 






Not applicable. As a general 
rule, the use of biometrics for 
general security 
requirements of property and 
individuals cannot be 
regarded as legitimate 
interest overriding the 
interests or fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the 
data subject. On the contrary, 
the processing of biometric 
data can 
only be justified as a required 
tool securing the property 
and/or individuals, where 
there is 
evidence, on the basis of 
objective and documented 
circumstances, of the 
concrete existence 
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of a considerable risk. To that 
end the controller needs to 
prove that specific 
circumstances 
pose a concrete, considerable 
risk, which the controller is 
required to assess with 
special care. 
Table 7 - Explanation and justification of lawfulness 
The processing of biometric data must be based on one of the grounds of legitimacy provided for in Article 6 
of the GDPR. In our scenario, the two possibilities are consent of the traveller or a contract with him.  
1. If consent is used as a legitimacy ground by the controller: 
 It must comply with the definition provided in Article 4(11) of the GDPR, which states that 
“‘consent of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous 
indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear 
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or 
her”. According to the Article 29 Working Party, “Consent is only valid when sufficient 
information on the use of biometric data is given. Since biometric data may be used as a 
unique and universal identifier providing clear and easily accessible information on how the 
specific data are used is to be regarded as absolutely necessary to guarantee fair processing. 
Therefore, this is a crucial requirement for a valid consent in the use of biometric data”.29 
 Furthermore, if consent is used as a ground to process “special categories of personal data” 
under which “biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person”30, this 
consent must be an “explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or 
more specified purposes […]”.  
 Finally, if consent is used as a basis of legitimacy, it must respect the conditions set up in 
Article 7 of the GDPR according to which: “1.  Where processing is based on consent, the 
controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of 
his or her personal data. 2.  If the data subject's consent is given in the context of a written 
declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in 
a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily 
accessible form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which 
constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding. 3.  The data subject shall 
have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall 
not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to 
giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as 
to give consent. 4. When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be 
taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a 
service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for 
the performance of that contract”. According to the Article 29 Working Party, “as consent 
can be revoked at any time, data controllers need to implement technical means that can 
reverse the use of biometric data in their systems. A biometric system operating on the basis 
of consent needs therefore to be able to efficiently remove all identity links it created”.31 
                                                          
29 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, WP193, adopted on 27th April 
2012, p. 11. 
30 See article 9 of the GDPR.  
31 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, WP193, adopted on 27th April 
2012, p. 11. 
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 It is important to note that according to the Article 29 Working Party: “in many cases in which 
biometric data are processed, without a valid alternative like a password or a swipe card, the 
consent could not be considered as freely given. For instance, a system that would 
discourage data subjects from using it (e.g. too much time wasted for the user or too 
complicated) could not be considered as a valid alternative and then would not lead to a 
valid consent”.32 Hence, in the absence of other alternative legitimate grounds, the PROTECT 
biometric authentication system could be used only if the travellers are free to decide 
whether to avail themselves of the said system. This means that alternative, less privacy-
intrusive mechanisms must be made available by the controller of PROTECT. Such a system 
will permit a traveller who is unwilling or unable to undergo biometric processing because of 
his/her personal circumstances to dissent. The sole choice between not using a service and 
giving one’s biometric data is a strong indicator that the consent was not freely given and 
cannot be considered as legitimate ground. 
2. If contract is used as a legitimacy ground by the controller: according to the Article 29 Working Party, 
“processing of biometric data can be necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data 
subject is party or can be necessary in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to 
entering into a contract. It has however to be noted that this applies in general only when pure 
biometric services are provided (which is the case in our scenario). This legal basis cannot be used to 
legitimate a secondary service that consists in enrolling a person into a biometric system. If such a 
service can be separated from the main service, the contract for the main service cannot legitimate 
the processing of biometric data. Personal data are not goods that can be asked for in exchange of a 
service, therefore contracts that foresee that or contracts that offer a service only under the 
condition that someone consents to the processing of his biometric data for another service cannot 
serve as legal basis for that processing”.33 
As a result of the analysis carried out in this section, the most appropriate ground of legitimacy for the use 
of the PROTECT system in our scenario would be a contract signed with a traveller for the purpose of offering 
him convenience services “on the move” such as giving him priority in waiting areas for “traditional” security 
and border checks and/or allowing him to benefit of additional convenience services such as access to VIP 
parking zones or waiting lounges. Furthermore, given that biometric data is processed for the purpose of this 
contract, the traveller should provide an explicit consent to the controller of the PROTECT system.34  
3.2.1.3 Explanation and justification of data minimization35 
It is important to reduce the severity of the risks by minimizing the number of personal data that will be 
processed, by limiting such data to what is strictly necessary for the purposes for which they are processed 
(otherwise they should not be collected). With this regard, the Article 29 Working Party has the opinion that 
“a specific difficulty may arise as biometric data often contain more information than necessary for matching 
functions. The principle of data minimisation has to be enforced by the data controller. Firstly, this means 
that only the required information and not all available information should be processed, transmitted or 
stored. Second, the data controller should ensure that the default configuration promotes data protection, 
without having to enforce it”. This second step minimizes the data themselves, via controls aimed at reducing 
their sensitivity.  
The table below lists the data processed, reduced to what is strictly necessary, alongside the justification of 
the need and any additional minimization controls. 
 
                                                          
32 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, WP193, adopted on 27th April 
2012, p. 10.  
33 Ibid, p.12.  
34 See article 9.2 (b) of the GDPR.  
35 See Article 5.1 (c) of the GDPR.  
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Justification of the 
need and 




























First name, last 
name, birthday, 
nationality, 
physical address.  
Information 
needed to register 
a traveller to the 
PROTECT 
programme.  
According to CNIL, good 
practices are: 
 Pseudonymization  
 Separate storage of 
identifying data in an 














traveller to the 
PROTECT 
programme. 
According to CNIL, good 
practices are: 
 Pseudonymization  
 Separate storage of 
bank and payment 






































According to CNIL, good 
practices are:  
 
 Use the WPA or 
WPA2 protocol with 
AES-CCMP 
encryption or the 
"Enterprise" mode of 
the WPA and WPA2 
protocols (using a 
RADIUS server as 
well as the EAP-TLS 
or PEAP 
subprotocols). 
 Prohibit ad-hoc 
networks. 
 Use and configure a 
firewall at network 
entry and exit points 
in order to partition 
off connected 
hardware as needed. 
 Use the SSL protocol 
(HTTPS) to ensure 
server authentication 
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and confidentiality of 
communications.  
 
In our scenario, to ensure 
connection security, the 
WIFI will use the WPA2 
encryption standard. The 
HTTPS-Protocol will be 
used to exchange data 
packages between the 
application and the 




tracking data  
Position tracking 






signals that are 
interpreted by 
the phone app. 








According to CNIL, good 
practices are: 
 Impose mutual 
authentication with 
remote devices. 
 Encrypt sharing 
traffic. 
 
These best practices 
should be embedded in 
our scenario.  







technical logs.  
Required for 
security reasons 






















































Not collected  
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2D Face VIS, 2D 










purpose of the “on 
the move” service 
which is offered to 
the traveller 
According to the WP29, 
good practices are:  
 Pseudonymization 
 Use of biometric 
templates 
 Storage on a personal 
device vs. centralised 
storage 
 Renewability and 
revocability 
 Encrypted form 
 Anti-spoofing 
 Biometric encryption 
and decryption 
 “Weak link” 
databases 
 
These best practices 
should be embedded in 
our scenario. 
Table 8 - Data minimization controls 
3.2.1.4 Explanation and justification of data quality  
Article 5(d) of the GDPR provides that personal data must be “accurate and, where necessary, kept up to 
date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard 
to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’)”. However, 
according to the Article 29 Working Party, “when biometric systems are used it is difficult to produce 100% 
error-free results. This may be due to differences in the environment at data acquisition (lighting, 
temperature, etc.) and differences in the equipment used (cameras, scanning devices, etc.)”.36 In order for 
biometric data to be accurate and relevant in proportion to the purpose for which there they were collected, 
the data must be accurate at enrolment and when establishing the link between the person and the biometric 
data. Accuracy at enrolment is also relevant to the prevention of identity fraud. 
Below you will find a table for setting out in detail the data quality compliance controls as well as a 
justification on the arrangements for or impossibility of implementing them. 
Data quality controls Justification  
Regular checks of the accuracy of the user's 
personal data 
Regular checks of the accuracy of the user’s 
multimodal data will be performed “naturally” 
                                                          
36 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, WP193, adopted on 27th April 
2012, p.9.  
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each time he walks through a BCA. In case of 
non-accuracy, the traveller will be given the 
possibility to proceed to a new enrolment 
process by the authorized staff. Updating 
biographic or bank data is also possible at 
enrolment kiosk.  
Invitation for the user to check and, where 
necessary, update his or her data 
In case of a failure of the verification process, 
the user will be invited to proceed to a new 
enrolment process by the authorized staff.  
Traceability of data amendments Timestamps of new enrolment events of 
multimodal data by the same traveller are 
pseudonymously stored in a separate database 
for security reasons and performance 
assessment of the system.  
Table 9 - Data quality controls 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, “taking into account the fact that biometric technologies cannot 
ensure full accuracy, there is always an implicit risk coming from incorrect identifications. Such false positives 
result in decisions affecting individual rights”.37 The specific impact on data protection of inaccuracy of a 
particular biometric system will depend on its purpose and particular circumstance. In the case of our 
scenario, a user subject to a false reject38 would face limited consequences such as a refusal to access to the 
commercial convenience services for which he paid. Given such limited consequences, a procedure which 
permits a data subject to proceed to a new enrolment at the Enrolment Kiosk seems to be an appropriate 
safeguard. The situation would of course be totally different if the PROTECT system was used for immigration 
control purposes or other public border control missions. In that case, implications on fundamental rights of 
data subjects would be much more severe, such as a violation of the right to free movement or to the right 
of liberty. In such a scenario, safeguards against false reject rates should be much more stringent.  
3.2.1.5 Explanation and justification of storage durations 
A storage duration must be defined for each type of data and justified by the legal requirements and/or 
processing needs. Functional traces will also have to be purged, as will technical logs which may not be stored 
indefinitely. 
Data types Storage 
duration 




at the end of 
the storage 
duration 
Passport data No storage, only 
manual check at 
enrolment by 
authorized staff.  
  
Identity, biographic data 3 years 
maximum 
The information is needed to 
register a traveller to the 
PROTECT programme and to 
manage him until the end of his 
registration. Registration to the 
programme must be renewed 
Automatic 
deletion after 
3 years or 
alternatively 
as soon as the 
traveller 
                                                          
37 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, WP193, adopted on 27th April 
2012, p. 18.  
38 The False Reject Rate (FRR): It is the probability that the system produces a false reject. A false reject occurs when an 
individual is not matched to his/her own existing biometric template. It is also known as the false negative rate. 
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after 3 years. Information can 
also be updated at the travel 
kiosk in case of inaccuracy.  
cancels his 
registration 
(when all due 
payments are 
done). 
Bank and payment data 3 years 
maximum 
The information is needed to 
register a traveller to the 
PROTECT programme and to 
manage him until the end of his 
registration. Registration to the 
programme must be renewed 
after 3 years.  Information can 
also be updated at the travel 
kiosk in case of inaccuracy. 
Automatic 
deletion after 
3 years or 
alternatively 




(when all due 
payments are 
done). 






enrolment kiosk.  
 
Duration of the 
verification 






Storage of WIFI information is 
limited to what is needed for 
the communication features of 









carried out).  







Position tracking is done via 
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). 
The Biometric Capture Area 
sends iBeacon signals that are 
interpreted by the phone app. 
Storage of BLE data is limited to 
what is required as part of the 
communication features 
between the Passport 
Companion and the Biometric 






Events logs 3 years  Application traces, timestamps 
of new biometric enrolment for 
the same traveller, technical 
logs are kept pseudonymously 
during 3 years for security 
reasons and performance 
assessment of the system. 
Automatic 
deletion after 
3 years.  
Encrypted templates of 
biometric data in the 




The information is needed to 
register a traveller to the 
PROTECT programme and to 
Automatic 
deletion after 
3 years or 
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 manage him until the end of his 
registration. Registration to the 
programme must be renewed 
after 3 years. Information can 
also be updated at the travel 
kiosk in case of inaccuracy. 
alternatively 









Encrypted templates of 
biometric data in the 
PROTECT Control System 





recorded in the 
BCA 
Information is needed for the 








Templates of biometric 
data in the enrolment 
kiosk 




phase in order to 
issue the 
encryption key 
Information needed for the 









Templates of biometric 
data in the PROTECT 
Control System  





recorded in the 
BCA 
Information needed for the 










The information is needed to 
process a traveller during his 
registration to the PROTECT 
programme. Registration to the 
programme must be renewed 
after 3 years. 
Automatic 
deletion after 
3 years or 
alternatively 




Live biometric data 
recorded in the BCA and 
processed in the 
PROTECT Control System 





recorded in the 
BCA 
Information needed for the 






Table 10 - Storage durations 
3.2.1.6 Assessment of the controls  
Controls guaranteeing the 
proportionality and necessity 
of the processing 
Acceptable/can be improved on? Corrective controls 
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Purposes: specified, explicit and 
legitimate 
Acceptable if “scenario 1” is used. Not 
acceptable if “scenario 2” is used. For a 
description of these scenarios, see 
table 6.  
 
None 
Basis: lawfulness of processing, 
prohibition of misuse 
Acceptable  None 
Data minimization: adequate, 
relevant and limited 
Acceptable if best practices of WP29 
and CNIL are embedded in our 
scenario 1.  
None 
Data quality: accurate and kept 
up-to-date 
Acceptable None 
Storage durations: limited Acceptable None 
Table 11 - Assessment of fundamental principles 
3.2.2 Controls protecting data subjects’ rights 
The aim of this sub-section is to:  
 Identify or determine, and describe, the controls (existing or planned) selected to comply with the 
following legal requirements (it is necessary to explain how it is intended to implement them): 
1. information for the data subjects (fair and transparent processing, see Art. 12, 13 and 14 of the 
GDPR); 
2. obtaining consent, where applicable13: express, can be demonstrated and withdrawn (see Art. 7 
and 8 of the GDPR); 
3. exercising the right of access and right to data portability (see Art. 15 and 20 of the GDPR); 
4. exercising the rights to rectification and erasure (see Art. 16 and 17 of the GDPR); 
5. exercising the right to restriction of processing and right to object (see Art. 18 and 21 of the GDPR); 
6. processors: identified and governed by a contract (see Art. 28 of the GDPR); 
7. transfers: compliance with the obligations bearing on transfer of data outside the European Union 
(see Art. 44 to 49 of the GDPR). 
 Check that improving each control and its description, in accordance with the GDPR, is either not 
necessary or not possible. 
 Where applicable, review their description or propose additional controls. 
3.2.2.1 Information for the data subjects 
Transparency is not defined in the GDPR. Recital 39 of the GDPR is informative as to the meaning and effect 
of the principle of transparency in the context of data processing: “It should be transparent to natural persons 
that personal data concerning them are collected, used, consulted or otherwise processed and to what extent 
the personal data are or will be processed. The principle of transparency requires that any information and 
communication relating to the processing of those personal data be easily accessible and easy to understand, 
and that clear and plain language be used. That principle concerns, in particular, information to the data 
subjects on the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing and further information to ensure 
fair and transparent processing in respect of the natural persons concerned and their right to obtain 
confirmation and communication of personal data concerning them which are being processed…”.  
The key articles in relation to transparency in the GDPR, as they apply to the rights of the data subject, are 
found in Chapter III (Rights of the Data Subject). Article 12 sets out the general rules which apply to the 
provision of information to data subjects (under Articles 13 - 14); communications with data subjects 
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concerning the exercise of their rights (under Articles 15 - 22); and communications in relation to data 
breaches (Article 34). In particular Article 12 requires that the information or communication in question 
must comply with the following rules: 
 it must be concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible (Article 12.1); 
 clear and plain language must be used (Article 12.1);  
 the requirement for clear and plain language is of particular importance when providing information 
to children (Article 12.1); 
 it must be in writing “or by other means, including where appropriate, by electronic means” (Article 
12.1); 
 where requested by the data subject it may be provided orally (Article 12.1) ; and 
 it generally must be provided free of charge (Article 12.5). 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, “the requirement that the provision of information to, and 
communication with, data subjects is done in a “concise and transparent” manner means that data 
controllers should present the information/ communication efficiently and succinctly in order to avoid 
information fatigue. This information should be clearly differentiated from other non-privacy related 
information such as contractual provisions or general terms of use. In an online context, the use of a layered 
privacy statement/ notice will enable a data subject to navigate to the particular section of the privacy 
statement/ notice which they want to immediately access rather than having to scroll through large amounts 
of text searching for particular issues”.39 WP29 recommends in particular that layered privacy statements/ 
notices should be used to link to the various categories of information which must be provided to the data 
subject, rather than displaying all such information in a single notice on the screen, in order to avoid 
information fatigue. Layered privacy statements/ notices can help resolve the tension between completeness 
and understanding, notably by allowing users to navigate directly to the section of the statement/ notice that 
they wish to read. It should be noted that layered privacy statements/ notices are not merely nested pages 
that require several clicks to get to the relevant information. The design and layout of the first layer of the 
privacy statement/ notice should be such that the data subject has a clear overview of the information 
available to them on the processing of their personal data and where/ how they can find that detailed 
information within the layers of the privacy statement/ notice. It is also important that the information 
contained within the different layers of a layered notice is consistent and that the layers do not provide 
conflicting information. 
 
Furthermore, according to the WP29, “a central consideration of the principle of transparency outlined in 
these provisions is that the data subject should be able to determine in advance what the scope and 
consequences of the processing entails and that they should not be taken by surprise at a later point about 
the ways in which their personal data has been used”.40 In accordance with the principle of accountability 
and in line with Recital 39, data controllers should assess whether there are particular risks for natural 
persons involved in this type of processing which should be brought to the attention of data subjects. This 
can help to provide an overview of the types of processing that could have the highest impact on the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the protection of their personal data. As for 
the “easily accessible” element, this means that the data subject should not have to seek out the information; 
it should be immediately apparent to them where and how this information can be accessed, for example by 
providing it directly to them, by linking them to it, by clearly signposting it, or as an answer to a natural 
language question.  
 
                                                          
39 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679, WP260, last Revised and Adopted 
on 11 April 2018, p.7.  
40 Ibidem.  
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As a result, the controller of the PROTECT system she should publish a privacy statement/ notice on his 
website concerning the proposed service. A direct link to this privacy statement/ notice should be clearly 
visible on the website, on the Enrolment Kiosk and on the mobile application (“passport companion”) under 
a commonly used term (such as “Privacy”, “Privacy Policy” or “Data Protection Notice”). Indeed, for apps, the 
WP29 considers that “the necessary information should also be made available from an online store prior to 
download. Once the app is installed, the information still needs to be easily accessible from within the app. 
One way to meet this requirement is to ensure that the information is never more than “two taps away” (e.g. 
by including a “Privacy”/ “Data Protection” option in the menu functionality of the app). Additionally, the 
privacy information in question should be specific to the particular app and should not merely be the generic 
privacy policy of the company that owns the app or makes it available to the public”41. 
 
Controls for the right to 
information 
Implementation 
Presentation and possibility of 
accessing the terms & 
conditions for 
use/confidentiality 
 A “Privacy policy” must be available on the website of the 
controller of the PROTECT system. 
 
 A link to this Privacy Policy will be available in the contract 
which is signed between the controller of the PROTECT system 
and the user 
  
 A link to this privacy policy will be available on the online store 
prior to downloading the app. Moreover, this concise text will 
be shown on the store in order to present the “passport 
companion” application: “The passport companion is a 
smartphone application allowing travellers willing to join the 
PROTECT programme to be given priority in waiting areas for 
security and border checks and allowing them benefit of 
additional convenience services such as access to VIP parking 
zones and waiting lounges. Exclusively for this purpose, the 
application processes sensitive data consisting of encrypted 
biometric templates of 2D (VIS and NIR) Face, 3D Face, 
Periocular (VIS and NIR) and Anthropometrics allowing 
contactless identification in Biometric Capture Areas”. 
 
 The same information will be provided on the “passport 
companion” as follows: 
 
                                                          
41 Ibid, p.8.  
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When the user clicks on the “here” button, the following additional 
information is provided:  
 
The Passport Companion processes 
encrypted templates of your contactless 
biometric modalities enabling your 
identification “on the move” for the 
purpose of enjoying the following 
PROTECT convenience services at 
borders: access to priority lanes, VIP 
parking zones and lounges.  
More information about our service and 
our privacy policy is available here 
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Figure 9 - Information screen 2 
 
Detailed presentation of the 
data processing purposes 
(specified objectives, data 
matching where applicable, 
etc.) 
The Privacy Policy will detail the purpose of the PROTECT system 
as follows:  
 
“The PROTECT system processes contactless biometrics 2D (VIS 
and NIR) Face, 3D Face, Periocular (VIS and NIR) and 
Anthropometrics of travellers in a smartphone app (“passport 
companion”) which communicates with a Biometric Capture Area 
(BCA) in which biometric sensors are placed for their identity 
confirmation “on the move”. The aim of the “PROTECT programme” 
is to allow travellers joining the programme to be given priority in 
waiting areas for “traditional” security and border checks and/or 
allowing them to benefit of additional convenience services such as 
access to VIP parking zones or waiting lounges. The aim of 
processing contactless biometrics in the passport companion and in 
the BCA is to keep the flow of travellers moving at an acceptable 
rate”.  
Detailed presentation of the 
personal data collected 
The Privacy Policy will detail the personal data being processed as 
follows:  
 
“In order to be able to provide the convenience services specified by 
contract, the PROTECT system processes your following personal 
data:  
Identity and the contact details of the 
controller and of the data protection officer 
The purpose of the Passport Companion is 
to process sensitive personal data 
consisting of encrypted templates of your 
contactless biometrics (2D Face VIS, 2D Face 
NIR, 3D Face, Periocular VIS, Periocular NIR, 
Anthropometrics) in order to enable your 
identification “on the move” when you walk 
through Biometric Capture Areas (BCAs) at 
borders to allow you to benefit from the 
PROTECTs’ convenience services which are 
described in the contract you signed with 
the PROTECT controller. Your explicit 
consent will be asked whenever access to 
your biometrics is required.  Your data will 
exclusively be processed by the controller of 
the PROTECT system and stored during 3 
years unless you unsubscribe before.  
Our Privacy Policy is available at link  
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 In the administrative server (during 3 years maximum unless 
subscription is cancelled before and all due payments are done):  
 
- Biographic data: First name, last name, birthday, nationality, 
physical address; 
- Accounting data: Bank account/Credit card number and 
data related to payments; 
 
 In the Enrolment Kiosk (stored only during enrolment phase for 
the purpose of encrypting your biometric data):  
- Biometric templates of 2D face (visual and near-infrared); 
- Biometric template of 3D face; 
- Biometric templates of Periocular (visual and near-
infrared); 
- Biometric template of Anthropometrics.  
 
 A unique encryption key is stored in the key database within the 
PROTECT Control System during 3 years maximum unless 
subscription is cancelled before.  
 
 In the “passport companion” (during 3 years maximum unless 
subscription is cancelled before by removing the application 
from your smartphone):  
- Encrypted biometric templates of 2D face (visual and near-
infrared); 
- Encrypted biometric template of 3D face; 
- Encrypted biometric templates of Periocular (visual and 
near-infrared); 
- Encrypted biometric template of Anthropometrics.  
 
 In the Biometric Capture Area, sensors are placed to capture live 
biometrics of 2D (VIS and NIR) Face, 3D Face, Periocular (VIS 
and NIR). These data are not stored but only processed during 
verification phase in order to be perform your identification “on 
the move”.  
 
 For communication purposes between your smartphone and 
the PROTECT system, WIFI and Bluetooth information is being 
processed during the enrolment and verification phases only.  
 
 Pseudonymized technical logs of events are stored during 3 
years for security reasons and performance assessment of the 
system. 
 
Presentation of any access to 
the identifiers of the device, 
the smartphone/tablet or 
computer, by specifying 
whether these identifiers are 
communicated to third parties 
WIFI information (Session id and Random number for 
authentication) and Bluetooth information are processed only by 
the PROTECT controller for communication reasons between the 
smartphone application and the PROTECT system. No third parties 
have access to these identifiers.  
Presentation of the user's 
rights (consent withdrawal, 
data erasure, etc.) 
Concerning the encrypted biometric templates in the passport 
companion, the user’s rights to consent withdrawal and data 
erasure can simply be performed by removing the application from 
the smartphone.  
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Concerning the biographic data, accounting data and unique 
encryption key, the user’s rights to consent withdrawal and data 
erasure can be performed by contacting the PROTECT controller (or 
data protection officer).  
Information on the secure data 
storage method 
 Biographic data and accounting data are stored encrypted and 
linked to a pseudonym stored in a different database; 
 
 The encryption key is linked to the same pseudonym;  
 
 Biometric templates are encrypted in the smartphone 
application; 
 
 To ensure connection security, the WIFI will use the WPA2 
encryption standard. The HTTPS-Protocol will be used to 
exchange data packages between the application and the 
servers of the PROTECT Control system. 
 
 
Arrangements for contacting 
the company (identity and 
contact details) about 
confidentiality issues 
Identity and the contact details of the controller and of the data 
protection officer should be mentioned here.  
Where applicable, information 
for the user on any change 
concerning the data collected, 
the purposes and 
confidentiality clauses 
If PROTECT contractual services are changing or added, the user 
will be notified through the smartphone application.  
Table 12 - Controls for the right to information 
3.2.2.2 Determination and description of the controls for obtaining explicit consent 
Where processing is based on consent, the controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has 
consented. The data subject must be able to withdraw his/her consent easily at any time. 
As the lawfulness of the PROTECT system is based on a contract with the traveller providing explicit consent 
for processing sensitive data (biometric templates)42, extra efforts should be undertaken in order to obtain 
this explicit consent of a data subject in line with the GDPR. The term explicit refers to the way consent is 
expressed by the data subject. It means that the data subject must give an express statement of consent. An 
obvious way to make sure consent is explicit would be to expressly confirm consent in a written statement. 
Where appropriate, the controller could make sure the written statement is signed by the data subject, in 
order to remove all possible doubt and potential lack of evidence in the future.43 In the case of the PROTECT 
system, an initial written consent for the processing of biometric modalities will be obtained by the signature 
of the PROTECT contract.  
However, according to the Article 29 Working Party, “such a signed statement is not the only way to obtain 
explicit consent and, it cannot be said that the GDPR prescribes written and signed statements in all 
circumstances that require valid explicit consent. For example, in the digital or online context, a data subject 
may be able to issue the required statement by filling in an electronic form, by sending an email, by uploading 
                                                          
42 Explicit consent is also one of the exemptions to the prohibition on the processing of special categories of data: See 
Article 9 GDPR. 
43 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679, WP259, last Revised and Adopted on 10 
April 2018, p. 18.  
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a scanned document carrying the signature of the data subject, or by using an electronic signature. In theory, 
the use of oral statements can also be sufficiently express to obtain valid explicit consent, however, it may 
be difficult to prove for the controller that all conditions for valid explicit consent were met when the 
statement was recorded. […] Two stage verification of consent can also be a way to make sure explicit consent 
is valid. For example, a data subject receives an email notifying them of the controller’s intent to process a 
record containing medical data. The controller explains in the email that he asks for consent for the use of a 
specific set of information for a specific purpose. If the data subject agrees to the use of this data, the 
controller asks him or her for an email reply containing the statement ‘I agree’. After the reply is sent, the 
data subject receives a verification link that must be clicked, or an SMS message with a verification code, to 
confirm agreement”.44 
Below you will find a list of controls intended to ensure that users' explicit consent has been obtained, that 
there has been a reminder and confirmation of their consent, and the settings associated with the latter have 
been maintained. 
Controls for obtaining consent Implementation 
 
Express consent during 





























After having downloaded the passport companion, the following 
information is provided to the traveller. If the traveller agrees, 
he can click on the “proceed” button.  
 
 
                                                          
44 Ibidem.  
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Figure 10 - Consent screen 1 
 
When the user clicks on the “proceed” button, the following 
invitation is shown to the traveller: 
 
The Passport Companion processes 
encrypted templates of your contactless 
biometric modalities enabling your 
identification “on the move” for the 
purpose of enjoying the following 
PROTECT convenience services at 
borders: access to priority lanes, VIP 
parking zones and lounges.  
More information about our service and 
our privacy policy is available here 
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Figure 11 - Consent screen 2 
 
When arriving at the Enrolment Kiosk (under supervision of 
authorized staff which has proceeded to the manual passport 
control to confirm the identity of the traveller and once the 
PROTECT contract has been signed by the user), the user clicks 
on “proceed” and enrolment screen 2 opens which contains a 
barcode scanner to scan the barcode displayed on the Enrolment 
Kiosk. The following screen is showed to the traveller in order to 
obtain a first step of explicit consent before proceeding to 
biometric enrolment.  
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Figure 12 - Consent screen 3 
 
The following screen appears after the user successfully scanned 
the Kiosk-Connection-Barcode. 
 
By scanning the barcode on the 
Enrolment Kiosk, you provide your 
explicit consent to enroll contactless 
biometric modalities (2D (VIS and NIR) 
Face, 3D Face, Periocular (VIS and NIR) 
and Anthropometrics) for the PROTECT 
system purposes.  
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Figure 13 - Consent screen 4 
Consent segmented per data 
category or processing type 
On the Enrolment Kiosk, explicit consent is asked before 
proceeding to the enrolment of each biometric modality. 
 
Once the enrolment process is completed, the following screen is 
showed:  
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Figure 14 - Consent screen 5 
Express consent prior to sharing 
data with the system 
When approaching a PROTECT Control System and before 
connecting, the following screen is showed:  
 
Your encrypted biometric 
modalities (2D (VIS and NIR) Face, 
3D Face, Periocular (VIS and NIR) 
and Anthropometrics) are 
successfully stored on your 
smartphone.  
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Figure 15 - Consent screen 6 
Obtaining parents' consent for 
minors.  
Not applicable. The PROTECT programme is not available for 
minors.  
After a long period without use, 
the user must be asked to 
confirm his/her consent 
Applicable. If the user does not use the system during one year, 
the application will ask the traveller whether he still wants to 
use it or wants to remove it.  
Where the user has consented to 
the processing of special data 
(e.g. his/her location), the 
interface clearly indicates that 
said processing takes place (icon, 
light) 
When approaching to the Biometric Control Area, the following 




The PROTECT system needs your 
consent:  
- to share your biometric 
templates via WIFI with the 
PROTECT Control System 
for identity confirmation; 
 
- to share your position with 
the Biometric Capture Area 
via Bluetooth.  
Click on this button if you 
consent to connect via 
WIFI and Bluetooth 
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Figure 16 - Consent screen 7 
The following is screen appears once the application is connected 
to the PROTECT Control System:  
 
PROTECT Control System 
detected !  
Establishing connection 
to PROTECT Control 
System… 
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Figure 17 - Consent screen 8 
This screen appears after the user’s biometric templates where 
successfully compared against the once gathered in the Biometric 
Capture Area:  
 
Connected to PROTECT 
Control System !  
Please walk through the 
Biometric Capture Area 
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Figure 18 - Consent screen 9 
Where the user changes device, 
smartphone or computer, 
reinstalls the mobile app, the 
settings associated with his/her 
consent are maintained 
Not feasible. If the user changes device or removes application, 
he must proceed to a new enrolment of biometric modalities at 
the Enrolment Kiosk.  
Table 13 - Controls for obtaining consent 
3.2.2.3 Controls for the rights of access and to data portability 
Article 15 of the GDPR provides data subjects with the right to obtain from the data controller access to their 
data, in general including their biometric data. If the data controller has to ascertain the identity of the data 
subjects to grant this access, it is essential that such access is provided without processing additional personal 
data. 
In the figure below, you will find a list of the controls intended to ensure users' right of access to all personal 
data concerning them. 
Controls for 
the right of 
access  




data, via the 
Possibility to access the 
encrypted templates of 
biometric modalities 
which are stored on the 
smartphone 
However, possibility to 
access the biographic data, 
accounting data and 
unencrypted templates of 
biometric modalities by 
Access to raw 
biometric modalities 
is not feasible since 
that they are not 
stored by the system. 
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sending a request of access 
to the PROTECT’s controller  
 
 
Direct access to 
unencrypted 
templates is not 
feasible since that the 
cryptographic key is 
internally stored in 
PROTECT’s servers 




traces of use 
associated with 
the user 
Possibility to access the 
traces of use generated 
by the mobile application  
Possibility to access event 
logs (Application traces, 
timestamps of new biometric 
enrolment for the same 
traveller) by sending a 






archive of all 
the personal 
data associated 
with the user 
Possibility to download 
the encrypted templates 
of the biometric 
modalities which are 
stored on the smartphone 
Not directly feasible.  
However, possibility to 
download an archive of the 
biographic data, accounting 
data, event logs and 
unencrypted templates of 
biometric modalities by 
sending a request of access 
to the PROTECT’s controller  
 
N/A 
Table 14 - Controls for the right of access 
The right to data portability applies to the PROTECT processing pursuant to Article 20 of the GDPR. It allows 
for data subjects to receive the personal data that they have provided to a controller, in a structured, 
commonly used and machine-readable format, and to transmit those data to another data controller. The 
new right to data portability aims to empower data subjects regarding their own personal data, as it facilitates 
their ability to move, copy or transmit personal data easily from one IT environment to another (whether to 
their own systems, the systems of trusted third parties or those of new data controllers)45. The right to data 
portability contains two parts:  
 Firstly, data portability is a right of the data subject to receive a subset of the personal data processed 
by a data controller concerning him or her, and to store those data for further personal use. Such 
storage can be on a private device or on a private cloud, without necessarily transmitting the data to 
another data controller. 
 Secondly, Article 20(1) provides data subjects with the right to transmit personal data from one data 
controller to another data controller “without hindrance”. Data can also be transmitted directly from 
one data controller to another on request of the data subject and where it is technically feasible. In 
essence, this element of data portability provides the ability for data subjects not just to obtain and 
reuse, but also to transmit the data they have provided to another service provider (either within the 
same business sector or in a different one). 
This being said, this right to data portability only applies “when technically feasible”46 and when it does “not 
adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others”47. With this regard, it is important to recall the Article 29 
Working Party’s opinion according to which “biometric templates should be extracted in a way that is specific 
                                                          
45 See Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on the right to data portability, WP 242, as last revised and adopted on 5 
April 2017.  
46 Article 20(2) of the GDPR.  
47 Article 20(4) of the GDPR.  
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to that biometric system and not used by other controllers of similar systems in order to make sure that a 
person can only be identified in those biometric systems that have a legal basis for this operation”48. In order 
to avoid function creep and violation of the purpose limitation principles, it is hence not technically feasible 
to provide data subjects with “re-useable” biometric templates.  
The figure below describes its implementation in the PROTECT system. 
Controls for 
the right to 
data 
portability 
Mobile app PROTECT’s servers Justification  
Possibility of 




provided by the 





templates are stored on 
the smartphone. These 
are accessible to the data 
subject. However, re-use 
of these templates by a 
different data controller 
is not technically feasible 
while ensuring respect of 
the purpose limitation 
principle (avoiding 
function creep).  
Only data stored in servers is 
biographic data and 
accounting data. These can be 
retrieved in XML format.  
 
Function creep has 
been a serious 








should be extracted 
in a way that is 
specific to that 
biometric system and 
not used by other 
controllers of similar 
systems in order to 
make sure that a 
person can only be 
identified in those 
biometric systems 
that have a legal basis 
for this operation”.  
Table 15 - Controls for the right to data portability 
3.2.2.4 Controls for the rights to rectification and erasure 
Controls for 
the rights to 
rectification 
and erasure 




Possibility to proceed to a 
new enrolment of 
biometric templates at 
the Enrolment Kiosk 
Possibility to rectify 
biographic and accounting 
data by request to the 







Possibility to erase the 
application including the 
biometric templates  
Possibility to erase 
biographic and accounting 
data by request to the 
PROTECT’s data controller 
 
N/A 
                                                          
48 See Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, WP193, Adopted on 27th 
April 2012, p. 31.  
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timestamps of new biometric 
enrolment for the same 
traveller, technical logs are 
kept pseudonymously during 
3 years for security reasons 
and performance assessment 
of the system. Biographic 
and accounting data are 







the right to be 
forgotten for 
minors 
The PROTECT system is 
not available for minors 
The PROTECT system is not 











companion” will provide 
a screen containing clear 
indications and simple 
steps for erasing data 













before selling it 
The “passport 
companion” will provide 
a screen containing 
advice about resetting the 







erasing the data 
in the event the 
device is stolen 
Not technically feasible 
unless the users’ 
smartphone settings 
allow erasing data at 
distance in case of theft. 
The passport companion 
will strongly advice users 










Table 16 - Controls for the rights to rectification and erasure 
3.2.2.5 Controls applicable to processors 
A processing contract must be signed with each processor, setting out all of the aspects stipulated in Art. 28 
of the GDPR: duration, scope, purpose, documented processing instructions, prior authorization where a 
processor is engaged, provision of any documentation providing evidence of compliance with the GDPR, 
prompt notification of any data breach, etc. 
This section of CNIL’s methodology does not apply to our scenario since that no data processors are involved.  
3.2.2.6 Controls on transfer of data outside the European Union 
EU data protection rules apply to the European Economic Area (EEA), which includes all EU countries and 
non-EU countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. When personal data is transferred outside the 
European Economic Area, special safeguards are foreseen to ensure that the protection travels with the data. 
The reform of EU data protection legislation offers a diversified toolkit of mechanisms to transfer data to 
third countries: adequacy decisions, standard contractual rules, binding corporate rules, certification 
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mechanism, codes of conduct, so-called "derogations" etc. Depending on the country in question to which 
the controller of PROTECT wishes to transfer the data, he will have to justify the choice of remote hosting 
and indicate the legal supervision arrangements implemented in order to ensure adequate protection of the 
data subject to a cross-border transfer.  
3.3 Study of data security risks 
The CNIL defines a “privacy risk” as a “hypothetical scenario that describes a feared event and all the threats 
that would allow this to occur”49. More specifically, it describes: 
 how risk sources (e.g.: identity fraud) 
 could exploit the vulnerabilities of supporting assets (e.g.: biometric data require specific attention 
because they unambiguously identify an individual)  
 in a context of threats (e.g.: spoofing) 
 and allow feared events to occur (e.g.: unwanted use of personal data) 
 on personal data (e.g.: a user’s biometric templates) 
 thus generating impacts on the privacy of data subjects (e.g.: misappropriation of commercial 
services not compensated). 
The following diagram summarises all the concepts above: 
 
Figure 19 - Risk components 
The risk level is estimated in terms of severity and likelihood: 
 severity represents the magnitude of a risk. It primarily depends on the prejudicial nature of the 
potential impacts50; 
 likelihood expresses the possibility of a risk occurring. It primarily depends on the level of 
vulnerabilities of the supporting assets when under threat and the level of capabilities of the risk 
sources to exploit them. 
                                                          
49 CNIL, PIA Methodology, February 2018, p. 8.  
50 In view of the context of the processing of personal data (nature of data, data subjects, purpose of the processing, 
etc.). 
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3.3.1 Best practices related to the assessment of security controls 
The aim of this section is to provide to a potential data controller of the PROTECT system, best practices to 
identify or determine the existing or planned controls (already undertaken), which can take three different 
forms: 
 controls bearing specifically on the data being processed: encryption, anonymization, partitioning, 
access control, traceability, etc.; 
 general security controls regarding the system in which the processing is carried out: operating 
security, backups, hardware security, etc.; 
 organizational controls (governance): policy, project management, personnel management, 
management of incidents and breaches, relations with third parties, etc. 
3.3.1.1 Best practices for controls treating the risks related to data security 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, “given their nature, the processing of biometric data requires 
special technical and organisational measures and precautions to prevent adverse effects to the data subject 
in the event of a data breach - in particular because of the risks of unlawful conduct resulting into the 
unauthorised "reconstruction" of a biometric feature from the reference template, their interlinking with 
different databases, their further “use” without the data subjects knowledge for non-compatible purposes 
with the original ones and/or the possibility that some biometrics data could be used to reveal racial or health 
information about subjects”.51 
The table hereunder presents the best practices recommended by the Article 29 Working Party for controls 
bearing specifically on biometric data.  
Controls bearing 




Use of biometric templates 
Biometric data should be stored as biometric templates whenever 
that is possible. Template should be extracted in a way that is specific 
to that biometric system and not used by other controllers of similar 
systems in order to make sure that a person can only be identified in 
those biometric systems that have a legal basis for this operation. 
Storage on a personal device 
vs. centralised storage 
Whenever it is permitted to process biometric data, it is preferred to 
avoid the centralised storage of the personal biometric information. 
Especially for verification, the Working Party considers it advisable 
that biometric systems are based on the reading of biometric data 
stored as encrypted templates on media that are held exclusively by 
the relevant data subjects (e.g. smart cards or similar devices). Their 
biometric features can be compared with the template(s) stored on 
the card and/or device by means of standard comparison procedures 
that are implemented directly on the card and/or device in question, 
whereby the creation of a database including biometric information 
should be, in general and if possible, avoided. Indeed, if the card 
and/or device is lost or mislaid, there are currently limited risks that 
the biometric information they contain may be misused. To reduce the 
risk of identity theft, limited identification data related to the data 
subject should be stored in such devices. 
 
                                                          
51 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, WP193, Adopted on 27th April 
2012, p.31. 
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However, for specific purposes and in presence of objective needs 
centralised database containing biometric information and/or 
templates can be considered admissible. The biometric system used 
and the security measures chosen should limit the mentioned risks 
and make sure that the re-use of the biometric data in question for 
further purposes is impossible or at least traceable. Mechanisms 
based on cryptographic technologies, in order to prevent the 
unauthorised reading, copying, modification or removal of biometric 
data should be used. When the biometric data are stored on a device 
that the data subject physically controls, a specific encryption key for 
the reader devices should be used as an effective safeguard to protect 
these data from unauthorised access. Furthermore, such 
decentralised systems provide for a better protection of the biometric 
data by design as the data subject stays in physical control of his 
biometric data and there is no single point that can be targeted or 
exploited. The Working Party also stresses that the idea of a 
centralised database covers a wide range of technical 





As the source of biometric data cannot be changed, biometric systems 
whose purpose is to establish an identity link must be designed in a 
way that the enrolment process and the processing of biometric data 
allows multiple and independent biometric templates to be extracted 
from the same source in order to be able to replace them in the case 
of a data breach or a technological evolution. Biometric systems 
should be designed in a way that allows to revoke the identity link, 
either in order to renew it or to permanently delete it e.g. when the 
consent is revoked. 
Encrypted form As for the security issue, adequate measures should be adopted to 
safeguard the data stored and processed by the biometric system: 
biometric information must always be stored in encrypted form. A key 
management framework must be defined to ensure that the 
decryption keys are only accessible on a need to know basis. Given the 
widespread use of public and private databases containing biometric 
information and the increasing interoperability of different systems 
using biometrics, the use of specific technologies or data formats that 
make interconnections of biometric databases and unchecked 
disclosures of data impossible should be preferred. 
Anti-spoofing To maintain the reliability of a biometric system and prevent identity 
fraud the manufacturer has to implement systems aiming to 
determine if the biometric data is both genuine and still connected to 
a natural person. In respect of facial recognition, it may be critical to 
ensure that the face is a real one and not, for example, a picture tied 
on an impostor’s head. 
Biometric encryption and 
decryption 
Biometric encryption is a technique using biometric characteristics as 
part of the encryption and decryption algorithm. In this case, an 
extract from biometric data is generally used as a key to encrypt an 
identifier needed for the service. This system has many advantages. 
With this system, there is no storage of the identifier or of the 
biometric data: only the result of the identifier encrypted with the 
biometrics is stored. Moreover, the personal data is revocable as it is 
possible to create another identifier that can be protected with 
biometric encryption as well. Finally, this system is more secure and 
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easier to use to the person: it solves the problem of remembering long 
and complex passwords. However, the cryptographic problem to 
overcome is not easy because encryption and decryption are 
intolerant to any changes in the key, whereas biometric provides 
different pattern which may give rise to changes in the extracted key. 
The system must therefore be able to compute the same key from 
slightly different biometric data, without increasing the False 
Acceptance Rate. 
Automated data erasure 
mechanisms 
In order to prevent biometric information being stored for longer than 
is necessary for the purposes for which they were collected or 
subsequently processed, appropriate automated data erasure 
mechanisms have to be implemented also in case the retention period 
may be lawfully extended, assuring the timely deletion of personal 
data that become unnecessary for the operation of the biometric 
system. When using integrated storage on the reader, manufacturers 
may also implement storage of the biometric templates on volatile 
memory that guarantees that the data will be erased when the reader 
is unplugged. Therefore, no biometric database remains when the 
reader is sold or uninstalled. Anti-pulling switches may also be used 
to automatically erase the data if someone tries to steal the reader. 
“Weak link” databases When a central database is used to counter identity fraud, the 
Working Party considers that technical measures must be 
implemented to avoid any purpose diversion. First, the data 
minimisation principle demands that only the data necessary to 
authenticate the person must be collected. For instance, it is 
considered that the comparison of the fingerprints of two fingers is 
precise enough to authenticate a person. Moreover, data controllers 
can use “weak link” databases where the identity of a person is not 
linked to a single biometric data set but rather to a group of biometric 
data set. The design of the database should guarantee the 
authentication of the person with a very good probability and make 
sure the database cannot be used for identification. The Working 
Party supports the use of such systems when large biometric 
databases are used for the purpose of struggle against identity fraud. 
Table 17 - Security controls bearing specifically on biometric data 
The aim of encryption is to make personal data unintelligible to anyone without access authorization. In the 
table below are detailed the CNIL’s best practices to be followed if the measure is used to address risks.  





 Determine what should be encrypted (including an entire hard 
disk, a partition, a container, certain files, data from a database or 
a communications channel, etc.) based on the form in which data 
is stored, the risks identified and the performance required. 
 
 Choose the type of encryption (symmetric or asymmetric) based 
on the context and the risks identified. 
 
 Adopt encryption solutions based on public algorithms known to 
be strong. 
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 Establish measures to ensure the availability, integrity and 
confidentiality of the information necessary to recover lost 
secrets. 
Specific measures for 
symmetric encryption 
 Only use a key for a single purpose. 
 
 Choose a mechanism that is recognized by the appropriate 
organizations. CNIL recommends the use mechanisms such as the 
AES algorithm which use a processed block size equal to at least 
128 bits, a non-deterministic encryption scheme (such as a CBC 
mechanism with a random initialization vector), cryptographic 
keys of a length appropriate to the expected useful life (for 
example, at least 128 bits for confidentiality guaranteed until 
2020) and which are not weak keys, etc. 
 
 Formally document the key management system. 
Specific measures for 
asymmetric (public key) 
encryption 
 Only use a key for a single purpose. 
 
 Choose a mechanism recognized by the appropriate organizations 
and that provides security proof. The CNIL recommends to use 
mechanisms such as the RSAES-OAEP which use cryptographic 
keys of a length appropriate to the expected useful life (for 
example, at least 128 bits for confidentiality ensured until 2020). 
 
 CNIL recommends generating the keys using a registered 
electronic certificate service provider.  
 
 Establish mechanisms for verifying the electronic certificates. 
CNIL recommends that when an electronic certificate is received, 
confirm, at a minimum, that it includes an indication of purpose 
consistent with expectations, is valid and has not been revoked 
and that a proper certification chain exists at all levels. 
 
 Protect the security of key generation and use consistent with 
their level in the key hierarchy. CNIL recommends protecting 
users' keys when stored (including restrictive rules governing 
access rights, password, chip and PIN card, etc.) and applying 
heightened security measures (for example: require that several 
of the holders of part of the secrets use the keys or store them in a 
safe deposit box) to the generation and use of a key management 
infrastructure's root keys (those that will be used to sign the other 
keys), etc. 
 
 Formally document the key management system. CNIL 
recommends developing a "certification policy" that specifies 
responsibilities, identification and authentication, certificate life-
cycle operational requirements, non-technical and technical 
security measures, certificate and revocation list profiles and 
compliance audits and other evaluations. 
Specific measures for 
encrypting equipment 
 Encrypt data at the hardware level (surface of the hard disk) or 
at the operating system level (encryption of a partition or a 
container). 
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 Choose systems that do not store keys on the equipment that will 
be encrypted unless this implements a secure storage device 
(such as a TPM chip for laptops). 
Specific measures for 
encrypting databases 
Based on the risks identified, encrypt the storage area (at the level of 
the hardware, operating system or database) so as to provide 
protection from physical theft, of the piece of data itself (encryption 
by application), with a view to guaranteeing the confidentiality of 
certain data as regards the administrators themselves. In the event of 
partitioned IT teams, database encryption can make data accessible 
only to database administrators, to the exclusion of system 
administrators. 
Specific measures for 
encrypting a 
communications channel 
 Encrypt the communications channel between an authenticated 
server and a remote client. CNIL recommends to use a service 
authentication certificate that complies with the most recent 
version of the TLS protocol (formerly SSL; consider requiring a 
password to use the private key and protecting access to it via 
very restrictive access rights), or SSH to set up a secure tunnel 
(VPN) or IP (VPN-IPSec) encryption solutions. 
Specific measures for Wi-Fi  Use the WPA or WPA2 protocol with AES-CCMP encryption or the 
"Enterprise" mode of the WPA and WPA2 protocols (using a 
RADIUS server as well as the EAP-TLS or PEAP subprotocols). 
Table 18 - Controls bearing on encryption 
The table below enumerates CNIL’s best practices related to additional measures for treating the risks related 
to data security.  
Additional measures for 
treating the risks related to 
data security 
Best practices 
Data partitioning (in 
relation to the rest of the 
information system) 
The aim of data portioning is to reduce the possibility of personal data 
being correlated and of a blanket data breach occurring (identify the 
datasets specific to each business and separate them in logical fashion, 
etc.). With this regard, CNIL’s recommendations are:  
 
 Identify the sole data necessary for each business process. The 
goal is to provide individuals with access only to the data they 
need. For example, do not provide the statistics department with 
access to first and last names. 
 
 Separate the data useful to each process in logical fashion. Manage 
the different access rights according to the business processes and 
establish a dedicated IT environment for systems that process the 
most sensitive data.  
 
 Regularly confirm that personal data are partitioned effectively 
and that recipients and interconnections have not been added. 
 
Logical access control  Manage users' profiles by separating tasks and areas of 
responsibility (preferably in centralized fashion) to limit access to 
personal data exclusively to authorized users by applying need-
to-know and least-privilege principles. 
 
 Identify every person with legitimate access to personal data by a 
unique identifier. 
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 Limit access to the tools and administration interfaces to 
authorized persons. 
 
 Where applicable, specify the rules applicable to passwords 
(minimum length, required characters, validity duration, number 
of failed attempts before access to account is locked, etc.). 
 
 Log information connected to the use of privileges.  
 
Traceability (logging) The aim of traceability is to ensure that consultation and action 
carried out by users of the processing are recorded and attributed, 
such that it is possible to provide evidence during investigations 
(logging system, protection, analysis, storage, etc.). With this regard, 
CNIL’s recommendations are: 
 
 Set up an applicative logging system that retains a record of data 
modifications and access carried out by the users and the time 
they took place. Date- and timestamp the logged incidents based 
on UTC time (Coordinated Universal Time), use a reliable time 
source (such as an NTP (Network Time Protocol) server or radio 
synchronization) to synchronize the equipment, centralize locally 
(assemble all the logs on a relatively isolated collection machine 
supported by a dedicated consultation workstation), export the 
logs (scheduled dispatches, automatic transfer or an 
administration network), provide for sufficient storage capacity, 
set up an archiving and backup system for the incident logs, 
protect the logging equipment and the information logged against 
sabotage and unauthorized access, ensure the strict 
confidentiality of logs, etc. 
 
 Set up user authentication, making it possible to attribute the 
logged incidents. Prohibit generic or shared identifiers, give 
precedence to strong, two-factor authentication, etc. 
 
 Comply with the requirements of the GDPR as regards logged 
events attached to an identified user. It is necessary to inform 
users of the traceability set up and not to use the records collected 
for other purposes, etc. 
 
 Conduct periodic analyses of the logged information and, if needs 
be, establish a system that detects abnormal activity 
automatically. 
Integrity monitoring The aim of integrity monitoring is to be warned in the event of an 
unwanted modification or disappearance of personal data (hash 
function, message authentication code, electronic signature, 
preventing SQL injections, etc.). With this regard, CNIL’s 
recommendations are: 
 
 Identify the data that must be monitored for integrity based on the 
risks identified. 
 
 Choose a method for monitoring their integrity based on the 
context, the risks assessed and the robustness required. 
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 Determine when the function is to be applied and when the 
monitoring should be performed based on implementation of the 
business process. 
 
 When the data are sent to a database, analytical measures must be 
set up to prevent scripting or SQL injection attacks.  
Paper document security As a reminder, in our scenario the PROTECT data processing is based 
on a contract with data subjects. Where paper documents containing 
data are used during the processing, indicate here how they are 
printed, stored, destroyed and exchanged.  
Table 19 - Additional measures for treating the risks related to data security 
3.3.1.2 Best practices for controls treating the risks related to the processing system  
The following CNIL’s best practices for controls generally concern the security of the whole system in which 
the processing is carried out. They can particularly be formally documented in a cybersecurity policy (PSSI) 
or equivalent. 
General security controls 
regarding the system in 
which the processing is 
carried out 
Best practices 
Operating security The PROTECT data controller should describe here how the software 
updates (operating systems, applications, etc.) and application of 
security corrective controls are carried out.  
Clamping down on 
malicious software 
The PROTECT data controller should state here whether an antivirus 
software is installed and updated at regular intervals on the 
workstations.  
Managing workstations The PROTECT data controller should describe here the controls 
implemented on workstations (automatic locking, firewall, etc.). 
Backups The PROTECT data controller should indicate here how backups are 
managed and clarify whether they are stored in a safe place.  
Maintenance The PROTECT data controller should describe here how physical 
maintenance of hardware is managed, and state whether this is 
contracted out. Indicate whether the remote maintenance of apps is 
authorized, and according to what arrangements. Specify whether 
defective equipment is managed in a specific manner. 
Security of computer 
channels (networks) 
The PROTECT data controller should indicate here the type of 
network on which the processing is carried out (isolated, private or 
Internet. In our scenario, the Enrolment Kiosk, the PROTECT control 
system and the BCA should all be disconnected from Internet. Specify 
which firewall system, intrusion detection systems or other active or 
passive devices are in charge of ensuring network security. 
Monitoring The PROTECT data controller should indicate here whether real-time 
monitoring of local network is implemented and with what means. 
Indicate whether monitoring of hardware and software 
configurations is carried out and by what means.  
Physical access control The PROTECT data controller should indicate here how physical 
access control is carried out regarding the premises accommodating 
the processing (zoning, escorting of visitors, wearing of passes, locked 
doors and so on). Indicate whether there are warning procedures in 
place in the event of a break-in. 
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Hardware security The PROTECT data controller should indicate here the controls 
bearing on the physical security of servers and workstations 
belonging to customers (secure storage, security cables, 
confidentiality filters, secure erasure prior to scrapping, etc.). 
Avoiding sources of risk The PROTECT data controller should indicate here whether the 
implantation area is subject to environmental disasters (flood zone, 
proximity to chemical industries, earthquake or volcanic zone, etc.). 
Specify if dangerous products are stored in the same area. 
Protecting against non-
human sources of risks 
The PROTECT data controller should describe here the means of fire 
prevention, detection and fighting. Where applicable, indicate the 
means of preventing water damage. Also specify the means of power 
supply monitoring and relief. 
Table 20 - Controls treating the risks related to the processing system 




Organization The PROTECT data controller should indicate if the roles and 
responsibilities for data protection are defined. Specify whether a 
person is responsible for the enforcement of privacy laws and 
regulations. Specify whether there is a monitoring committee (or 
equivalent) responsible for the guidance and follow-up of actions 
concerning the protection of privacy. 
Policy (management of 
rules) 
The PROTECT data controller should indicate whether there is an IT 
charter (or equivalent) on data protection and the correct use of IT 
resources. 
Risk management The PROTECT data controller should indicate here whether the 
privacy risks posed by new treatments on data subjects are assessed, 
whether or not it is systematic and, if applicable, according to which 
method. Specify whether an organization-level mapping of privacy 
risks is established. 
Project management The PROTECT data controller should indicate here whether device 
tests are performed on non-real/anonymous data. 
Management of incidents 
and data breaches 
The PROTECT data controller should indicate here whether IT 
incidents are subject to a documented and tested management 
procedure. 
Personnel management The PROTECT data controller should indicate here what awareness-
raising controls are carried out with regard to a new recruit. 
Indicate what controls are carried out when persons who have been 
accessing data leave their job. 
Relations with third parties As a reminder, in our scenario, no data processors are involved. 
However, if it was the case, the PROTECT data controller should 
indicate here, for processors requiring access to data, the security 
controls and arrangements carried out as regards such access. 
Supervision The PROTECT data controller should indicate here whether the 
effectiveness and adequacy of privacy controls are monitored. 
Table 21 - Organizational controls (governance) 
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3.3.2 Risk assessment: potential privacy breaches 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, in data processing activities involving biometrics, a DPIA should 
aim to assess how the three following risks can be avoided or substantially limited by the system it analyses52:  
1) The first risk is identity fraud/inaccuracy, especially in the case of identification and authentication. 
The biometric device should not be fooled by a spoofing attack and ensure that the person who is 
attempting to perform the matching really is the person that is registered in the system.  
2) The second risk is the purpose diversion either by the data controller itself or by a third-party 
including law enforcement authorities. This common threat regarding personal data becomes a 
crucial one when biometric data are used. Manufacturers should take all security measures to avoid 
any improper use of the data and make sure that any data that are not needed anymore for the 
purpose of the processing are deleted immediately. As with any other data, legitimately processed 
or stored biometric data or the sources of biometric may not be processed or enrolled by the 
controller for any new or other purpose unless there is a new legitimate ground for this new 
processing of these data. 
3) The third risk is data breach that requires in the biometric data context special actions depending on 
which kind of data have been compromised. If a system is used that creates biometric data based on 
an algorithm that converts a biometric template into a certain code, and either the biometric data or 
the algorithm is stolen or compromised they need to be replaced. When a data breach involves the 
loss of directly identified biometric data that are very close to the source of biometric data such as 
pictures of faces or fingerprints, the concerned person needs to be notified in detail in order to be 
able to defend himself in a possible future incident where these compromised biometric data may 
be used against him as evidence. 
The general objective of the next sections is to gain a good understanding of the causes and consequences 
of risks of the PROTECT system for the data subjects. Hence, for each feared event (identity fraud/inaccuracy, 
purpose diversion, and data breach53), the aim of these sections is to: 
1. determine the potential impacts on the data subjects’ privacy if it occurred54; 
2. estimate its severity, particularly depending on the prejudicial nature of the potential 
impacts and, where applicable, controls likely to modify them; 
3. identify the threats to personal data supporting assets that could lead to this feared 
event55 and the risk sources that could cause it; 
4. estimate its likelihood, particularly depending on the level of vulnerabilities of personal 
data supporting assets, the level of capabilities of the risk sources to exploit them and the 
controls likely to modify them. 
. 
                                                          
52 Ibidem, p.30.  
53 They are not or no longer available (breach of personal data availability). 
54 Answer the question "What do we fear might happen to data subjects?". 
55 Answer the question "How might this happen?". 
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3.3.2.1 Identity fraud  
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56 See typology of risk sources in CNIL, PIA Knowledge Bases, February 2018 edition, p.3.  
57 See typology of the outcomes of feared events in CNIL, PIA Knowledge Bases, February 2018 edition, p.3.  
58 See scales and rules for estimating severity in CNIL, PIA Knowledge Bases, February 2018 edition, p.4.  
59 See scale and rules for estimating likelihood in CNIL, PIA Knowledge Bases, February 2018 edition, p.6.  
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Table 22 - Risk assessment of identity fraud 
3.3.2.2 Purpose diversion 
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Table 23 - Risk assessment of purpose diversion 
3.3.2.3 Data breach 




































































of data  
 
Loss of 





Use of biometric 
templates 
 

















































which they will 
be able to 
overcome 


























PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 Deliverable D2.3 













Table 24 - Risk assessment of data breach 
4 Conclusion  
This Deliverable “D2.3 - Privacy impact of next-generation biometric border” applies the French data 
protection authority’s (CNIL) data protection impact assessment methodology (DPIA) to an alternative (and 
legitimate in real-world conditions) scenario for the use of the PROTECT system in which emerging biometric 
modalities are processed in a “passport companion” such as a smartphone for “comfort and convenience 
purposes” of travellers on basis of a contract with the PROTECT’s data controller and their explicit consent.  
In this scenario, emerging contactless biometrics are enrolled in a smartphone app for travellers willing to 
join a “PROTECT programme” allowing them to be given priority in waiting areas for “traditional” security 
and border checks and/or allowing them to benefit of additional convenience services such as access to VIP 
parking zones or waiting lounges. The aim of this DPIA is to assess the impact on data protection of a new 
category of access-control mechanism particularly suited for border-crossings based on multimodal 
biometric fusion “on the move” while respecting the legal framework and personal data security. The main 
findings of this DPIA are the following:  
 According to the Article 29 Working Party, the requirement that “personal data must be collected for 
legitimate purposes” means that the purposes must be “in accordance with the law” in the broadest 
sense: “this includes all forms of written and common law, primary and secondary legislation, 
municipal decrees, judicial precedents, constitutional principles, fundamental rights, other legal 
principles, as well as jurisprudence, as such 'law' would be interpreted and taken into account by 
competent courts”. Therefore, D3.1 scenarios60 must be considered as “illegitimate” since that these 
would be in contradiction with the current legal framework on biometric border control as analysed 
in D2.2. For this reason, in this DPIA, the purpose of the PROTECT system is deemed to be the 
allowance of “comfort and convenience” services to frequent travellers. 
 The most appropriate ground of legitimacy for the use of the PROTECT system in our scenario would 
be a contract signed with a traveller for the purpose of offering him convenience services. 
Furthermore, given that biometric data is processed for the purpose of this contract, the traveller 
should provide an explicit consent to the controller of the PROTECT system. 
 In order to achieve data minimization, no passport data neither raw biometric data is processed by 
the PROTECT system. In principle the raw biometric data may not be reconstructed from the 
templates. Furthermore, the use of pseudonymization and of multimodality using different 
biometrics in a simultaneous way makes it possible to use a “weak link” process where the 
pseudonym of a person (not directly his real identity) is not linked to a single biometric data set but 
rather to a group of biometric data sets. As a consequence, data minimization is improved by the fact 
                                                          
60 In D3.1 scenarios, the purpose of the PROTECT system is to “facilitate” public border control authorities to speed up 
their public interest missions of border control management by enrolling emerging biometrics in travel documents (or 
smartphone apps acting as travel documents) in addition of passport information (including traditional biometric 
modalities – facial image and fingerprints).  
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that each single set of biometric data does not have to provide a very high probability of 
authentication as long as the fused biometric data set guarantees a high probability of authentication 
of a given pseudonym.  
 According to the Article 29 Working Party, “taking into account the fact that biometric technologies 
cannot ensure full accuracy, there is always an implicit risk coming from incorrect identifications. 
Such false positives result in decisions affecting individual rights”. The specific impact on data 
protection of inaccuracy of a particular biometric system depends on its purpose and particular 
circumstance. In the case of our scenario, a user subject to a false reject would face limited 
consequences such as a refusal to access to the commercial convenience services for which he paid. 
Given such limited consequences, a procedure which permits a data subject to proceed to a new 
enrolment at the Enrolment Kiosk seems to be an appropriate safeguard. The situation would of 
course be totally different if the PROTECT system was used for immigration control purposes or other 
public border control missions. In that case, implications on fundamental rights of data subjects 
would be much more severe, such as a violation of the right to free movement or to the right of 
liberty. In such a scenario, safeguards against false reject rates should be much more stringent. 
 In order to prevent biometric information being stored for longer than is necessary for the purposes 
for which they were collected or subsequently processed, appropriate automated data erasure 
mechanisms have to be implemented by the PROTECT system. With regards to this in our scenario, 
a very important safeguard is that almost no sensitive data are centrally stored. The biometric system 
is based on the reading of biometric data stored as encrypted templates on media that are held 
exclusively by the relevant data subjects (smartphones). The data subjects can easily remove any 
biometric templates on their phones by removing the application.  
 The controller of the PROTECT system should publish a privacy statement/ notice on his website 
concerning the proposed service. A direct link to this privacy statement/ notice should be clearly 
visible on the website, on the Enrolment Kiosk and on the mobile application (“passport companion”) 
under a commonly used term (such as “Privacy”, “Privacy Policy” or “Data Protection Notice”). 
Indeed, for apps, the WP29 considers that “the necessary information should also be made available 
from an online store prior to download. Once the app is installed, the information still needs to be 
easily accessible from within the app. One way to meet this requirement is to ensure that the 
information is never more than “two taps away” (e.g. by including a “Privacy”/ “Data Protection” 
option in the menu functionality of the app). Additionally, the privacy information in question should 
be specific to the particular app and should not merely be the generic privacy policy of the company 
that owns the app or makes it available to the public”.  
 Explicit consent for the processing of biometric templates of data subjects should be sought at 
different stages of the PROTECT process. Furthermore, data subjects should be provided with 
controls for the rights of access and to data portability.  
 
 The most critical security risks which are identified are identity fraud/inaccuracy, purpose diversion, 
and data breach. Each of these feared events have been assessed to be limited both in likelihood and 
in severity if the following main controls are implemented: pseudonymization, use of biometric 
templates, storage on a personal device vs. centralised storage, renewability and revocability of the 
templates, encrypted communications channels, anti-spoofing measures, biometric encryption and 
decryption, multimodal biometric fusion, employee clearance, physical access control, logical access 
control, traceability (logging), notification of data subject violations and recommendation of suitable 
preventive controls.  
 
 
The findings of this Deliverable concern a suitable scenario for use of the system in “real-world conditions”. 
These findings do not oppose demonstration of PROTECT technologies during the demonstration phase of 
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the project. Trials conducted exclusively for research purposes could demonstrate the feasibility of combining 
passport information (including traditional biometrics) and additional contactless biometrics of volunteers 
on the basis of their explicit consent with the aim to match their identities against fictional (emulated) 
“watchlists” specifically developed for these scientific trials. The data protection safeguards of such trials 
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